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ARTICLES
THE TRANSPARENCY Fix: ADVOCATING
LEGAL RIGHTS AND THEIR ALTERNATIVES IN
THE PURSUIT OF A VISIBLE STATE
Mark Fenster
ABSTRACT
The administrative norm of transparency, which promises a solution to the
problem of government secrecy, requires political advocacy organized from outside
the state. The traditional approach, typically the result of organized campaigns to
make the state visible to the public, has been to enact freedom of information laws
(FOI) that require government disclosure and grant enforceable rights to the public.
The legal solution has not proven wholly satisfactory, however. In the past two
decades, numerous advocacy movements have offered different fixes to the
information asymmetry problem that the administrative state creates. These
alternatives now augment and sometimes compete with legal transparency regimes.
This article surveys and analyzes transparency advocacy campaigns and the "fix"
that each proposes to the problems created by the state's asymmetrical information
advantage over the public. It sketches the history of four campaigns: the FOI
movement in the United States, the global anti-corruption movement (spearheaded
by Transparency International), the digital-transparency movement, and the advent
of WikiLeaks.
. Professor and Samuel T. Dell Research Scholar, Levin College of Law, University of Florida. Thanks
to David Fontana, Rachel Rebouchd, Steven Sampson, and Trysh Travis for comments and suggestions.
I presented an early version of this article at the First Global Conference on Transparency Research at
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The article offers two insights: First, although these movements share a basic
set of assumptions and tell a similar policy story-secrecy is a pressing
administrative problem that can be fixed with the right policies and institutional
arrangements-they diverge significantly in how they understand not only the
problem's causes but the state itself Second, the article unveils transparency as a
contested political issue that masquerades as an administrative tool. Rooted in
contestable claims about the state's legitimacy and performance, the transparency
fix leads to tendentious prescriptions about law, policy, and the state.
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INTRODUCTION: THE INFORMATION ASYMMETRY PROBLEM
Government transparency does not spring naturally from the modem
democratic state. As Max Weber maintained, "[b]ureaucratic administration always
tends to exclude the public, to hide its knowledge and action from criticism as well
as it can."' The prerogative to create and maintain information asymmetries is one
that government entities and officials do not easily surrender. 2 Open government
laws, which create legally enforceable rules requiring government entities to make
information available, are thus largely the consequence of concentrated political
activism and advocacy. For more than five decades, a broad transparency advocacy
movement, composed of a diverse array of organizations operating from the
transnational to local level, has attempted to address and mitigate the fundamental
democratic and administrative problems that information asymmetry creates for
legitimate and effective governance.
At its inception, the movement understood and defined excessive state
secrecy as a problem caused by a scarcity of laws-one that could be solved by a
powerful, wide-ranging, and publicly enforceable legal right to government
information. The quintessential campaign, which had historical antecedents and
contemporaries in the United States and elsewhere,4 was the mid-twentieth century
effort in the United States that resulted in enactment of the federal Freedom of
1 3 MAX WEBER, ECONOMY AND SOCIETY: AN OUTLINE OF INTERPRETIVE SOCIOLOGY 992 (Guenther
Roth & Claus Wittich eds., 1968).
2 See id. at 992-93 (identifying the bureaucracy's "pure power interest" in protecting its secrets from the
legislature, something it will defend "fanatically").
For a summary of the claims made about secrecy's costs to legitimate and effective governance, see
Mark Fenster, The Opacity of Transparency, 91 IOWA L. REV. 885, 895-902 (2006).
4 The most important domestic predecessor is discussed infra Part I-A. If one views transparency
advocacy as a subset of more general campaigns for good government, then it dates back at least to the
Progressive Era, when a social and political movement led the charge for reforms to eradicate
bureaucratic corruption, especially at the municipal level. See ROBERT H. WIEBE, THE SEARCH FOR
ORDER: 1877-1920, at 164-85 (1967). Indeed, Louis Brandeis' famous claim that sunlight is "the best of
disinfectants," made as part of his campaign as a progressive trustbuster, dates from this period. LOUis
D. BRANDEIS, OTHER PEOPLE'S MONEY AND How THE BANKERS USE IT 92 (Augustus M. Kelley
Publishers 1986) (1914). With respect to international precedents, Anders Chydenius, a priest and
legislator, led Sweden to adopt the first freedom of information law in 1766. See Juha Manninen, Anders
Chydenius and the Origins of World's First Freedom of Information Act, in THE WORLD'S FIRST
FREEDOM OF INFORMATION ACT: ANDERS CHYDENIUS' LEGACY TODAY 18 (Juha Mustonen ed., 2006).
But the Swedish law was limited to the press and did not establish a public right to information; nor did
it augur a significantly more open domestic state or inspire imitation in the manner of the U.S. FOIA.
See Leena Luhtanen, Transparency at the Core of Democracy, in THE WORLD'S FIRST FREEDOM OF
INFORMATION ACT: ANDERS CHYDENIUS' LEGACY TODAY, supra, at 56; Manninen, supra, at 52-53.
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Information Act in 1966." That campaign has never ended. Numerous
contemporary domestic and international non-governmental organizations (NGOs)
6endeavor to preserve, strengthen, and extend open government mandates.
But the results of the freedom of information (FOI) campaign's labors, while
considerable, have not fully solved the problem that it sought to address, at least for
the many advocates in the U.S. and around the world who regularly complain about
the laws' limited scope and their inadequate enforcement.7 In recent decades,
several new networks and groups have responded to these frustrations by
advocating alternative means to open the state to public view. Law, their efforts
imply, is not the answer to secrecy, or at least not the only solution.
I discuss three such campaigns in this article. The anti-corruption movement,
exemplified by the NGO Transparency International, views transnational and
domestic activism-which includes both lobbying for freedom of information laws
and gathering and distributing information about governmental performance-as
essential weapons in the larger battle to identify and stigmatize venal states and
unscrupulous officials. This movement insists that transnational NGOs can use the
5 Freedom of Information Act, 5 U.S.C. § 552 (2006) (FOIA).
6 Organizations that campaign on behalf of freedom-of-information laws include
OpenTheGovemment.org, a coalition of organizations devoted to "stimulating legislative and executive
branch action and garnering media attention to the benefits of government openness," We Do,
OPENTHEGOVERNMENT.ORG, http://www.openthegovernment.org/wedo (last visited July 7, 2012 ), the
National Freedom of Information Coalition, which "protects our right to open government," especially
at the state level, About NFOIC, NAT'L FREEDOM OF INFO. COALITION, http://www.nfoic.org/about-
nfoic (last visited July 7, 2011), and OMB Watch, which "exists to increase government transparency
and accountability; to ensure sound, equitable regulatory and budgetary processes and policies; and to
protect and promote active citizen participation in our democracy," About Us, OMB WATCH (July 28,
2011), http://www.ombwatch.org/about us. Internationally, the human rights organization Article 19
defends and promotes freedom of expression and freedom of information all over the world and
especially promotes "international human rights standards and . .. legislation that protects the right to
speak and right to know in countries emerging from conflict, war and genocide or repression." Who We
Are, ARTICLE 19, http://www.articlel9.org/pages/en/who-we-are.html (last visited July 7, 2012). The
website freedominfo.org, which is funded by several foundations and works with the National Security
Archive in the U.S., serves as a "virtual network" for the many national FOI movements that have
emerged in the last few decades, and provides "crucial information on freedom of information laws and
how they were drafted and implemented, including how various provisions have worked in practice."
About Us, FREEDOMINFO.ORG, http://www.freedominfo.org/about-us/ (last visited Nov. 7, 2011). For
general descriptions of the international FOI advocacy movement, see ALASDAIR ROBERTS, BLACKED
OUT: GOVERNMENT SECRECY IN THE INFORMATION AGE 107-11 (2006); John M. Ackerman & Irma E.
Sandoval-Ballesteros, The Global Explosion of Freedom of Information Laws, 58 ADMIN. L. REV. 85,
121-23 (2006).
See infra notes 87-89 and accompanying text.
8 See infra Part II.
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information they obtain from and about the state to lobby, pressure, and shame
government into operating more accountably.9 Second, the "digital transparency"
movement champions the use of information technology and networked
communication as the solution to government secrecy, as well as a medium that can
create a more participatory, collaborative state.' 0 For its advocates, technology will
open the state by freeing its data." Third, WikiLeaks claims that its technological
ability to distribute liberated (or stolen) government documents over the Internet
will usher in a newly transparent state.12 This organization views itself as enforcing
the public's natural and internationally recognized human right to government
information through extralegal means, assisted by arguably illegal acts-and often
ones that are clearly illegal.' 3 These four campaigns-FOI, anti-corruption, digital
transparency, and WikiLeaks-share a commitment to the nearly religious,
normative concept of transparency around which they are organized,' 4 while each
focuses on different issues and offers a distinct set of policy prescriptions.
"Transparency" is a goal, a happy ending that inspires very different policy stories.
This article probes the continuities and discontinuities among these
movements and in the stories they tell.' 5 My purpose is two-fold. First, I explain
that each of these movements operates privately-that is, as an activist advocating
from outside of the statel6-in search of a means to fix what it views as a
9 Id.
1o See infra Part Ill.
" Id.
12 See infra Part IV.
13 Id.
14 See Christopher Hood, Transparency in Historical Perspective, in TRANSPARENCY: THE KEY TO
BETTER GOVERNANCE? 3, 3-5 (Christopher Hood & David Heald eds., 2006) (noting the abstract nature
of transparency as a concept, as well as its "quasi-religious significance" and its ongoing evolution).
" There can be no doubt about transparency's ascendance as a concept among academic advocates,
especially in the economic and legal academic literature. See Emiliano Grossman et al., Economies
Through Transparency, in TRANSPARENCY IN A NEW GLOBAL ORDER: UNVEILING ORGANIZATIONAL
VISIONS 97, 100-01 (Christina Garsten & Monica Lindh de Montoya eds., 2008) (displaying a chart that
shows an extraordinary rise in use of the term in journals within the EconLit database between 1986 and
2004, and especially between 1997-2004); Guy I. Seidman, Lawyers are from Mars, Political Scientists
are from Venus: Who Gets Transparency Right? (Mar. 21, 2011) (unpublished manuscript) (on file with
author) (finding in search of law review publications between 1990 and 2010 a nearly forty-fold
increase in the use of the term "transparency" and a nearly three-fold increase in the use of the term
"freedom of information").
16 They are all led by NGOs and funded by a mix of civic-minded interest groups, charitable
foundations, and like-minded individuals. Among the leading foundations that support work on
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fundamental and pervasive problem endemic to government. They share
assumptions about the needs and rights of democratic citizens to have access to
government information in order to mitigate--or, better, eradicate-the asymmetric
informational advantage the state enjoys over its public. But they diverge
significantly in how they understand not only the problem's causes but also the
state itself. In extolling the virtues of its own particular fix, each campaign offers a
broader vision of transparency's mission, one tied to its particular understanding of
the current state and of the better state that it hopes will emerge under the
administrative conditions that its work will surely help create. The transparency
fix-an idea that occupies a pivotal position in contemporary debates about
governance, administration, and regulation-thus reveals our political and social
anxieties about administration and about how we understand and attempt to correct
the shortcomings of administrative law.
Second, the article unveils transparency as a contested political issue that
masquerades as an administrative tool. The existing literature advocating and
developing transparency as a concept has failed to map out transparency as a
diverse and contested political field; instead, it has assumed transparency's status
transparency are the Open Society Foundations, which sponsor a "Transparency and Integrity Fund" to
increase access to information at the U.S. state and federal levels and provide support for individual
projects throughout the world. See About the Transparency and Integrity Fund, OPEN Soc'Y FOUNDS.,
http://www.soros.org /about (last visited July 7, 2012) (announcing availability of funding "for a wide
range of policy advocacy strategies" relating to transparency); Fiscal Decentralization Initiative, LOc.
Gov'T & PUB. SERVICE REFORM INITIATIVE, http://1gi.osi.hu/documents.php?m id=191 (Feb. 18, 2009)
(subsidiary of Open Society Institute); Rising Voices Launches Technology for Transparency Network,
OPEN Soc'Y FOUNDs., http://www.soros.org/initiatives/information/focus/communication/news/
transparency-tools-20100119 (Jan. 19, 2010) (announcing a program co-created by Open Society
Foundations grantee to promote the "use of technology for transparency and accountability" throughout
Latin America, Asia, and Africa, among other places). Other foundations that have funded or established
transparency-related projects include the Carnegie Corporation of New York and the Ford Foundation.
See Carnegie Results: Spring 2010, CARNEGIE CORP. OF N.Y., http://carnegie.org/fileadmin/Medial
Publications/camegie resultsspring_10 final_02.pdf (Spring 2010) (highlighting Carnegie's support
for the Project on Government Oversight, a "nonprofit organization that works with whistle-blowers to
add transparency to government operations"); Democratic and Accountable Government: Promoting
Transparent, Effective and Accountable Government, FORD FOUND., http://www.fordfoundation.org/
issues/democratic-and-accountable-govemment/promoting-transparent-effective-and-accountable-
government (last visited July 7, 2012) (announcing support for "community-driven efforts to improve
the transparency and integrity of government institutions and processes"). Indeed, the problems that
WikiLeaks has faced in receiving private donations-beginning in late 2010, major credit card
companies, payment processors, and the owners of other payment systems stopped enabling individuals
to send money to WikiLeaks-illustrate the extent to which NGOs must rely upon fundraising from
private sources. On WikiLeaks's financial struggles, see Yochai Benkler, A Free Irresponsible Press:
WikiLeaks and the Battle Over the Soul of the Networked Fourth Estate, 46 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV.
311, 341-43 (2011).
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as a universal norm and debated the technical and legal issues of optimal
administration and application.1 7 But as I demonstrate, each transparency
campaign's competing fix and vision of a more perfect, visible state rests on
contested claims about the state's legitimacy and performance, and competing
theories of law, policy, and the state. That is, each movement and its fix implicate
"transparency" in a much broader set of normative commitments. To understand
transparency as an historically contingent concept and administrative norm, one
must understand the political and social world within which it is defined by the
networks, groups, and individuals who attempt to pressure the state to adopt their
vision of visible, accountable governance. Viewed in context rather than simply as
a transcendent normative goal or neutral technical tool, transparency emerges as a
political concept that is deployed in diverse campaigns as a part of broader political
and economic projects.
Part I begins by introducing the legal-based and rights-based understanding of
transparency that developed in the mid-twentieth century U.S. It describes that
campaign's two distinct stages: First, as World War II was winding down,
newspaper editors' trade groups sought to export free speech ideals and the model
of an objective and independent press abroad to the new world that the post-war
period seemed to herald. Later, those trade groups shifted their attention to what
they saw as the growing problem of domestic state secrecy. This second period
adapted the legalistic concepts of press freedom and rights that had been developed
in the earlier period as a "right to know" and the "freedom of information" for the
somewhat different project of advocating laws to require the U.S. government to
disclose information to the public. Parts II through IV describe three contemporary
movements that attempt to extend the transparency ideals in the U.S. and
internationally: the transnational campaign to fight corruption (Part II); the effort to
remake the state and its relationship to the public in a digital, networked world
(Part III); and, in the WikiLeaks organization, the vigilante struggle to impose an
1 In earlier work, I have reviewed the normative and consequential literature on transparency, which
focuses on its democratic and administrative benefits and costs; this large body of work considers what
transparency does, not the political conditions under which transparency is adopted. See Fenster, supra
note 3, at 894-910. Works that offer normative arguments in transparency's favor provide brief accounts
of the FOI movement and of more recent efforts to advocate transparency, but they generally provide
little historical, political, and social context. See, e.g., ARCHON FUNG, MARY GRAHAM & DAVID WElL,
FULL DISCLOSURE: THE PERILS AND PROMISE OF TRANSPARENCY 24-29 (2007) (describing "The
Struggle Toward Openness" and "A Slow March Toward Right-to-Know" before shifting to the history
of disclosure-based regulation); SUZANNE J. PIOTROWSKI, GOVERNMENTAL TRANSPARENCY IN THE
PATH OF ADMINISTRATIVE REFORM 21-24 (2007) (providing an "overview and history of the federal
FOIA" in a study of the relationship between open government and the new governance or new public
management movement).
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ethic of transparency on a recalcitrant state (Part IV). The conclusions to Parts II
through IV provide a comparative perspective on the different campaigns, noting
their continuities and discontinuities, and the Conclusion summarizes what this
study reveals about transparency and the longing for a fix to the information
asymmetry problem the state creates.18
I. THE LEGAL RIGHTS FIx: FOIA AND THE ORIGINS OF THE
"RIGHT TO KNOW" AND "FREEDOM OF INFORMATION"
In the decades following World War I and especially in the latter years of
World War II, leading newspaper editors and press associations actively worked to
export abroad the American model of a private, for-profit press insulated from
government oversight and censorship. Frequently referred to as a plan to promote
the "freedom of information" and the public's "right to know," the campaign
rehearsed the ideas that would culminate decades later in the Freedom of
Information Act (FOIA). In addition to advocating in favor of public access to
government information as one among many issues, the campaign helped sharpen
the arguments in favor of limiting state secrecy, and it established the press' ability
to collaborate with government entities to achieve that goal. The initial
transparency advocacy movement eventually enjoyed legislative success and laid
both the conceptual and organizational groundwork for what has become an
international network of institutions advocating on behalf of transparency.
A. Exporting Rights and Freedoms
The initial campaign began as a response to two related issues: concerns about
the availability of foreign markets for American newsgathering and distribution and
a desire to export American free press and liberal democratic ideals. The American
press and especially the American wire services-which supplied national and
international news to many local newspapers and thus, at the time, were the
country's most global and national media firms-faced journalistic and economic
constraints in attempting both to collect news in other countries and to export their
products around the world. In the mid-nineteenth century, a cartel of major
European news agencies, which included Reuters (Great Britain), Agence Havas
(France), and Wolff (Germany) as its original members, had divided the world
among themselves for purposes of newsgathering. They agreed both to geographic
18 My focus here is largely on efforts to address executive branch and administrative secrecy, but it can
apply to campaigns focused on congressional secrecy. See, e.g., Jane S. Schacter, Digitally
Democratizing Congress? Technology and Political Accountability, 89 B.U. L. REV. 641, 648-62
(2009) (describing efforts to use the Internet to impose transparency on Congress).
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constraints limiting themselves to their demarcated territories and to publish
international news only from the cartel's members.19 The American Associated
Press (AP) was invited to join the cartel in 1887 and enjoyed the competitive
advantages it provided for several decades.20 The AP did not find its participation
entirely satisfactory, however. As the U.S. newspaper industry and the domestic
market for news grew, the cartel's constraints on the AP's newsgathering
operations abroad bridled the expanding company. The AP faced tougher domestic
competition from the United Press (UP) (founded in 1907), which was
unconstrained by the cartel agreement.21 At the same time, the AP had started its
own newsgathering information in far-flung territories, first in South America and
then around the world.22
The AP was also concerned about the cartel's effects on news content. The
European agencies had formal and informal ties to national governments that
sought to shape news for propagandistic ends. As a result, the AP complained,
foreign media frequently under-reported news from the United States and described
the country in an uncomplimentary fashion.23 For the American press, this potent
and dangerous mix of troubling practices-individual wire services that had close
relationships with their own governments, a cartel with oligopolistic control over
international news distribution, and the lack of the objective news values that
American news editors increasingly prized--endangered the press and nation's
political and economic interests.24
These conditions prompted news organizations-as both interested parties
and upholders of emergent ideals for a free press-to help develop entrepreneurial,
independent news media around the world. In the narrative that Cold War
'9 Terhi Rantanen, The Struggle for Control of Domestic News Markets (1), in THE GLOBALIZATION OF
NEws 35, 36-37 (Oliver Boyd-Barrett & Terhi Rantanen eds., 1998).
20 Terhi Rantanen, Foreign Dependence and Domestic Monopoly: The European News Cartel and U.S.
Associated Presses, 1861-1932, 12 MEDIA HIST. 19, 26-27 (2006) [hereinafter Rantanen, Foreign
Dependence].
21 MARGARET BLANCHARD, EXPORTING THE FIRST AMENDMENT 6-7 (1986).
22 Rantanen, Foreign Dependence, supra note 20, at 28-30. Indeed, the UP also directly competed with
the cartel itself, leading the cartel finally to grant AP full membership in order to compete more
effectively with UP's challenge. Terhi Rantanen, Mr. Howard Goes to South America: The United Press
Associations and Foreign Expansion, ROY W. HOWARD MONOGRAPHS IN JOURNALISM AND MASS
COMM. RES., May 15, 1992, at 22-24.
23 BLANCHARD, supra note 21, at 7; KENT COOPER, BARRIERS DowN 43 (1942).
24 OLIVER BOYD-BARRETT, THE INTERNATIONAL NEWS AGENCIES 209-11 (1980); COOPER, supra note
23, at 43-44.
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advocates constructed to tell the story about the necessity for informational
freedom and rights,25 the AP's commercial triumph, in which the agency and its
powerful general manager Kent Cooper broke free from and helped smash the
global news cartel in 1934, was not merely a self-serving effort to expand the
company's commercial reach. It also accompanied a full-fledged campaign to
promote democracy. 26 The cartel's demise, coupled with the havoc wreaked on
German and French news production by the Nazi party's ascent and Germany's
subsequent occupation of France in World War II, allowed American corporate
entities to seize market share and gain influence through the distribution of news
and propaganda to Western Europe and developing countries in the post-war
period.27 Once the cartel was broken, Cooper proclaimed, no more would such a
"perfect instrument that could covertly, effectively and without the suspicion of the
uninitiated carry on the great game of international government propaganda." 28
Indeed, as the AP and UP began to coordinate as well as compete, the U.S.
emerged in the post-war period as the only nation with multiple news services,
helping it to take a leading position in the global competition over news and media
content.29 The American press' triumphant effort to advance what it viewed as the
25 On the relationship between ideals of the "free flow of information" and the Cold War, see Hanno
Hardt, Comparative Media Research: The World According to America, 5 CRITICAL STUD. MASS
COMM. 129, 132-33 (1988).
26 GRAHAM STOREY, REUTERS' CENTURY, 1851-1951, at 186-94 (1951); HERBERT BRUCKER,
FREEDOM OF INFORMATION 214-15 (1949). Significantly, Cooper gave his memoir of the AP's fight
against the cartel, published in the midst of World War II, the martial title Barriers Down. Cooper's
story was self-serving and not entirely true; the AP, in fact, had a more complex, often friendly
relationship with the government-controlled members of the international press cartel, and its efforts
were as much in response to competition from the United Press as for a broader ideological or
nationalistic purpose. See TERHI RANTANEN, AFTER FIVE O'CLOCK FRIENDS: KENT COOPER AND ROY
W. HOWARD 25-27 (1998).
27 One can view this critically, as a form of cultural imperialism, see, for example, HERBERT SCHILLER,
MASS COMMUNICATIONS AND AMERICAN EMPIRE 24-45 (1969); Altaf Gauhar, Free Flow of
Information: Myths and Shibboleths, 1 THIRD WORLD Q. 53, 53-54 (1979), or as a means to lower
barriers that stopped content and commerce from flowing freely among nations for ideological and
commercial reasons, see for example Erwin D. Canham, International Freedom of Information, 14 LAW
& CONTEMP. PROBS. 584, 584-85 (1949).
28 KENT COOPER, THE RIGHT TO KNOW 154 (1956).
2 DANIEL R. HEADRICK, THE INVISIBLE WEAPON: TELECOMMUNICATIONS AND INTERNATIONAL
POLITICS 1851-1945, at 189-90 (1991); EMILY S. ROSENBERG, WORLD WAR I AND THE GROWTH OF
UNITED STATES PREDOMINANCE IN LATIN AMERICA 187 (1987).
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free markets it needed to thrive was ideological as well as profitable, 30 a fact
occasionally remarked upon by European skeptics. 31
Having defeated its competitors abroad, the American press turned
evangelical. In its 1944 convention, the American Society of Newspaper Editors
(ASNE), the most active trade group representing news editors and journalists,
announced a campaign to protect "the right of the people" against censorship and to
advocate for "freedom of information" around the world.32 The campaign included
a world tour undertaken (with the assistance of the State Department) by three
editors during the waning days of the war to review the state of the press in other
30 See, e.g., Kent Cooper, Newspaper Statesmanship for Peace, in JOURNALISM IN WARTIME 214, 215-
16 (Frank Luther Mott ed., 1943) (noting, in a short article exhorting the press to exert itself in peace
negotiations because of the importance of a free press and informed public to ending wars, the
relationship between wars and the prosperity of the international news industry).
3 In the most public such episode, the British magazine, the Economist, viewed Cooper's aggressive
efforts to expand the AP as an independent source of news throughout the world quite skeptically,
complaining that he
experiences a peculiar moral glow in finding that his idea of freedom
coincides with commercial advantage. In his ode to liberty there is no
suggestion that when all barriers are down the huge financial resources of the
American agencies might enable them to dominate the world....
[D]emocracy does not necessarily mean making the whole world safe for the
A.P.
The Press: Storm Warning, TIME (Dec. 11, 1944), http://www.time.com/time/magazine/article/
0,9171,883902,00.html (quoting the Economist). In a response published in Time, Cooper suggested that
perhaps the Economist wanted the British to control world communications. Id. Five years later, in his
book Freedom of Information, Herbert Brucker explicitly defended the confluence of free press and
enterprise and asked, "Suppose there is opportunity for commercial gain in striking down the barriers
that block nation off from nation-is it not still a good idea?" BRUCKER, supra note 26, at 215. Whether
a "good idea" or not, Cooper sought to do more than simply counter foreign propaganda with the
products and viewpoints of the American press; the AP's work preeminently served the commercial
interests of American media industries that exported their news reporting abroad via their wire services
and to open those markets to American reporters-all as part of American companies' efforts to
compete against the press services of other nations. For a general description of the incident and of the
ongoing tensions between American and European diplomats and press representatives in the post-war
negotiations about United Nations freedom of information agreements, see BLANCHARD, supra note 21,
at 23-25.
32 George Kennedy, Advocates of Openness: The Freedom of Information Movement (Aug. 1978)
(unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, University of Missouri at Columbia) (on file with author). Cooper
himself called for such a campaign that same year in the pages of Life. See Kent Cooper, Freedom of
Information: Head of Associated Press Calls for Unhampered Flow of World News, LIFE, Nov. 13,
1944, at 55.
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nations,33 lobbying efforts on behalf of international rights for a free press in the
new United Nations,34 and collaboration with the Truman administration to spur
development of an international press industry that would adopt the American
model of the profession.3 5 Press representatives ultimately played key roles in the
Sub-commission on Freedom of Information created by the UN's Human Rights
Commission in 1947 and, alongside prominent Harvard constitutional law
professor Zechariah Chafee, served as delegates to the Conference on Freedom of
Information held in Geneva in 1948.36
In a 1949 article, Erwin Canham, editor of the Christian Science Monitor,
officer of the American Society of News Editors, and member of the American
delegation in Geneva,3 7 surveyed journalistic practices around the world and
ranked them against the preeminent work of the American media in supporting the
American democratic model. None quite matched up, although Canada and Britain
came close. Therefore, Canham argued, the U.S. must spearhead the effort to free
the flow of information throughout the world and thereby expand political freedom
and fight the growing threat of authoritarianism:
Of course, despotisms of various degrees will finally end when the people really
know what is happening to them-when they learn the facts of international and
national life-and thus throw off their chains. Freer information, in the broadest
sense, will ultimately bring tyranny down. And so the efforts to lower barriers
will ultimately produce conditions that will bring about a truly free press
everywhere.38
The specter of "tyranny" he identified meant the Soviet Union, of course, the
principal Cold War threat. Alongside many of his fellow prominent newspaper
editors, Canham played a semi-official role in the United States' effort to spread its
vision of a liberal democracy abroad. For Canham and his colleagues, the ideal
33 See ALICE Fox PIrrs, READ ALL ABOUT IT! 50 YEARS OF ASNE 174-81 (1974). The tour was led by
led by Ralph McGill, an editor for the Atlanta Journal-Constitution and chairman of the ASNE's
Freedom of Information Committee. See Leonard Ray Teel, The Shaping ofa Southern Opinion Leader:
Ralph McGill and Freedom ofInformation, 5 AM. JOURNALISM 14, 14-27 (1988).
3 BLANCHARD, supra note 21, at 52-89; Prrs, supra note 33, at 182-85.
3 BLANCHARD, supra note 21, at 2.
3
6 d. at 155-63, 174-97.
" Id at 174-75.
38 Canham, supra note 27, at 589 (A typographical error in original source was corrected here.).
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press was private, independent, and capable of objectively reporting on events, and
enjoyed and helped enforce liberal democratic rights. The press under an
authoritarian government, by contrast, served as the state's mouthpiece, a
propaganda organ rather than a true Fourth Estate. A truly free press, therefore,
required not only a private, independent set of media institutions but also a limited,
non-intrusive state. It was up to the U.S. and its press institutions to spread the
word.
Ironically, this project-intended to promote the ideals of a free press-
required underwriting by the very government whose clutches journalists feared.
The midcentury American press viewed the federal government's intervention in
the marketplace of ideas and news as a significant, authoritarian-like threat to
American democracy. 40 During World War I and its aftermath, the government had
not only acted as an official censor, a traditional role for the state during wartime,
but also as a major producer of informational content akin to propaganda. 41 The
government's post-war informational activities now included pushing material to
the public in order to grab the attention and shape the attitudes of its citizens, like
the growing consumer-goods industries that utilized press agents and advertisers to
push their interests and hawk their wares.42 For the editors who sought its support
3 During the Cold War, scholars and journalists noted that different approaches to press freedoms
existed, that nation states generally adopted one of them and disdained the others, and that the
underlying theory justifying each approach rested on the political theory underlying each nation's
regime. The American model was decidedly "libertarian" or classically liberal, and contrasted with the
authoritarian, Soviet communist (which scholars differentiated from the authoritarian model) and social-
democratic, "social responsibility" models. See generally FRED S. SIEBERT, THEODORE PETERSON &
WILBUR SCHRAMM, FOUR THEORIES OF THE PRESS (1956); see also WILLIAM E. BERRY ET AL., LAST
RIGHTS: REVISITING FOUR THEORIES OF THE PRESS 7-16 (John C. Nerone ed., 1995) (historicizing and
updating the "Four Theories" model).
40 COOPER, supra note 28, at 64, 95-96, 147-48; BRUCKER, supra note 26, at 221. This conflict arose
not only from the importance the press placed on its independence from the state. Newspaper publishers
tended to be quite conservative and disliked President Roosevelt, the Democratic Party, and the New
Deal. See BLANCHARD, supra note 21, at 2.
41 COOPER, supra note 28, at 163-65.
42 See id at 308 (warning that a passive "American layman," allowing the state to "do[] his thinking for
him," will allow the government to infringe his "Right to Know"). Cooper's concern about propaganda
spread by government press agents was widely shared in the 1930s. See E. PENDLETON HERRING,
PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION AND THE PUBLIC INTEREST 362-67, 373-76 (1936) (describing the Roosevelt
administration's increasing use of "public relations" professionals in its attempt to manage publicity and
the press); MICHAEL SCHUDSON, DISCOVERING THE NEWS 134-44 (1978) (discussing generally the
press' distaste for the public relations industry); see, e.g., JOHN DEWEY, INDIVIDUALISM OLD AND NEW
43 (1930) (characterizing the "publicity agent" as "the most significant symbol of our present social
life").
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in their international campaign, the state thus represented both a means to project
press freedom ideals and a grave threat to the press' crucial role in reporting news
objectively and thoroughly.43
In this sense, the movement to export First Amendment and journalistic
values also reflected a strong professional identity among the press leaders who
viewed the journalistic enterprise as free, independent, and objective, and staffed
by full-time, well-trained, professional journalists." Journalistic objectivity in this
context served as an American professional ideal and norm, and stood in opposition
to political and ideological partisanship and to subjective or biased reporting.45 In
journalism historian Michael Schudson's authoritative account, objectivity defines
and disciplines journalism as a vocation: it binds publishers, reporters, and editors
together through a series of rituals that define what journalism is and how it is
produced; it allows constituents of the journalistic community to recognize and
exclude those who fail to practice it correctly; and it organizes the bureaucratic
43 State influence on the press and the public was not the press' only concern about government
interference. During the New Deal, the Roosevelt administration had fought to impose against news
organizations federal laws and regulations that applied to employers, including the Social Security Act,
the National Industrial Recovery Act, federal labor laws, and the Wagner Labor Relations Act, as well
as federal laws and regulations intended to regulate advertising. Claiming that these laws would infringe
constitutional free speech rights if applied to the press-an argument that the press lost-newspapers
and their owners, whose relative conservatism made them skeptical, if not hostile, to the New Deal
anyway, resisted the state's intrusion into their business. Margaret A. Blanchard, The Hutchins
Commission, The Press and the Responsibility Concept, JOURNALISM MONOGRAPHS, May 1977, at 4-8.
As the Supreme Court declared in Associated Press v. NLRB, 301 U.S. 103, 132 (1937), "[t]he publisher
of a newspaper has no special immunity from the application of general laws."
" On the history of journalism's understanding of itself as a profession with a distinct and crucial social
and political position and a self-developed and enforced code of conduct, see Howard Tumber & Marina
Prentoulis, Journalism and the Making of a Profession, in MAKING JOURNALISTS 58, 60-68 (Hugo de
Burgh ed., 2005). The Commission on Freedom of the Press, a private, widely heralded group of leading
academics and government officials brought together under the leadership of Robert Hutchins, president
of the University of Chicago at the time, declared in its 1947 final report that the press had the social
and professional responsibility to provide "full access to the day's intelligence" and a "truthful,
comprehensive, and intelligent account of the day's events in a context which gives them meaning."
COMM'N ON FREEDOM OF THE PRESS, A FREE AND RESPONSIBLE PRESS 21, 28 (1947). On the Hutchins
Commission generally, see Blanchard, supra note 43, at 88-89.
4s Wolfgang Donsbach, Lapdogs, Watchdogs and Junkyard Dogs, 9 MEDIA STUD. J. 17 (1995); Gaye
Tuchman, Objectivity as Strategic Ritual: An Examination ofNewsmen's Notions ofObjectivity, 77 AM.
J. OF Soc. 660, 660-78 (1972). A foil that freedom-of-information advocates employed for purposes of
defining objectivity were publications produced by and for particular private interest groups, especially
the labor press supported by unions. See LEONARD RAY TEEL, THE PUBLIC PRESS, 1900-1945, at 172-
74 (2006); BRUCKER, supra note 26, at 248-51.
UNIVERSITY OF PITTSBURGH LAW REVIEW
PAGE | 458 | VOLUME 73 (2012)
practice of journalism and the training of those who wish to enter the profession.46
The objectivity ideal helps justify the press' explicit right to be free from
government constraint, and it constitutes the pillar of the press' role as an
independent institution of civil society-one just as important to the protection of
individual rights and democratic institutions as an independent judiciary.
B. The Right to Know and Freedom of Information, from Press
Ideals to Legal Informational Rights
All of the circumstances described above-the political economy of the
international news industry, the AP's struggles with the European news cartel, the
emergent ideal of press freedom during the gathering Cold War, and the press' self-
conception of journalism as a vocation organized around the objective reporting of
news-contributed to the historical context in which the phrases "freedom of
information" and the "right to know" began to circulate. Kent Cooper used the
phrase "right to know" as early as 1945 and as the title of his 1956 book on the
general topic of press freedom.47 He defined it both affirmatively, as the right of
individuals to have access to full and accurate news reporting, and negatively, as
prohibiting the government from interfering with the relationship between the press
and its public. "It means," he wrote, "that the government may not, and the
newspapers and broadcasters should not, by any method whatever, curb delivery of
any information essential to the public welfare and enlightenment." 48 He also
offered a modern revision of the Constitution's First Amendment: "Congress shall
make no law ... abridging the Right to Know through the oral or printed word or
any other means of communicating ideas or intelligence."4 9 In Cooper's
understanding, the right to information belongs to the public; the state has the legal
duty to disclose and is prohibited from restraining the press; and the independent
commercial press serves as the essential go-between with an ethical, as opposed to
legal, duty to ferret out and present information. The press-which enjoys a
longstanding and well-entrenched constitutional right-would protect the public's
right by transforming data into knowledge and thereby allow the reading public to
respond rationally and act politically, as capable democratic citizens.
46 Michael Schudson, The Objectivity Norm in American Journalism, 2 JOURNALISM 149, 151-52, 165-
67(2001).
47 COOPER, supra note 28; The Right to Know, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 23, 1945, at 18.
48 COOPER, supra note 28, at 16.
4 Id.
THE TRANSPARENCY Fix
PAGE I 459
The term "freedom of information" had a similar meaning. President Franklin
Delano Roosevelt used it in a press conference in 1940 to refer to the flow of
uncensored news, identifying it as one of the key principles of democratic
government and the un-enumerated freedoms that the Constitution set in motion,50
while President Truman used it similarly in a message to Congress in 1947
reporting on U.S. participation in the United Nations.s' At the same time, news
editors viewed and deployed the phrase as part of the broad ideal of press freedom.
The ASNE established a "Freedom of Information Committee" to push for
international speech liberalization, and Herbert Brucker, one of that committee's
chairmen during the early post-war period, appropriated the term as the title for his
1949 book on the need for press freedom. 52 The nascent international human rights
movement appropriated the phrase as well. In its first meeting in 1946, the United
Nations General Assembly issued a declaration calling for recognizing and
protecting the freedom of information as a fundamental, "touchstone" human right
while defining it quite broadly: "Freedom of information implies the right to
gather, transmit and publish news anywhere and everywhere without fetters."
5o CASS SUNSTEIN, THE SECOND BILL OF RIGHTS: FDR'S UNFINISHED REVOLUTION AND WHY WE
NEED IT MORE THAN EVER 78-79 (2004). The phrase did not appear in FDR's "four freedoms" speech
he made to Congress in 1941, which instead only referred to the "freedom of speech and expression-
everywhere in the world."
51 See President Harry S. Truman, Message to the Congress Transmitting First Annual Report on U.S.
Participation in the United Nations (Feb. 5, 1947), available at http://www.trumanlibrary.org/
publicpapers/index.php?pid=2225 (equating the concept with "action to break down the barriers to a
wider, freer flow of information in the world"); see also Sanford J. Ungar, The Role of a Free Press
Strengthening Democracy, in DEMOCRACY AND THE MASS MEDIA 368, 393 (Judith Lichtenberg ed.,
1990) (reporting Truman's use of the phrase in several speeches in 1947).
52 TEEL, supra note 45, at 17-18; BRUCKER, supra note 26; Kiyul Uhm, The Cold War Communication
Crisis: The Right to Know Movement, 82 JOURNALISM & MASS COMM. Q. 131, 139 (2005). Brucker
added a further meaning defining the term as a key element in the relationship between the press and its
public: "freedom of information for newspapers and related media will have not only the historic sense
of freedom from government but also include freedom from any attachment, direct or indirect, to any
class, political party, economic group, or other fraction of society." BRUCKER, supra note 26, at 276.
His definition suggested in its breadth (which went beyond the Bill of Rights' much simpler check on
state power) the concern that the press must report news free from biases that would arise from
"attachment" to anything besides the professional norms of objective reportage. Freedom of information
was an institutional freedom for the press from external interference of any kind, including the state and
private interests.
" G.A. Res. 59, U.N. DOC. A/RES/59(I) (Dec. 14, 1946), available at http://www.un.org/Docs/journal
asp/ws.asp?m=A/Res/59(I). Two years later, a draft convention on Freedom of Information that failed to
garner sufficient support defined the term as "the free interchange of information and opinions, both in
the national and in the international sphere." BLANCHARD, supra note 21, at 410-14. Although Article
19 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights adopted the general language of free expression and
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As concepts, the right to know and freedom of information overlap in a
number of important ways and have endured as key phrases in the movement for
open government. First, although they concern much more than simply government
information, the concepts identified and sought to protect an international and
national right that would limit the state's control of information flows. Second, they
conceptualized the state as something distinct from the public-as an entity that
represents and governs its citizens but is distant from them. The public must be
protected from the state, while the state must be checked from violating private
individuals' rights, which in this context meant the right to receive information and
to "know." Third, the terms assume that information, in its raw and cooked forms
as data, news stories, and opinion, constitutes a truth to which the public must have
access in order to gain knowledge and act as citizens.
And finally, at least in its American version as defined by Cooper and
Brucker, the terms contemplate a free and independent press as the public's agent
in protecting the right to know and in delivering the information that should flow
freely. Rights (to know) and freedoms (of information) simultaneously enable the
press to report objectively, without the constraints of excessive state or private
interest, and allow that independent pillar of society to play its crucial role in a
functional democracy. As the institution capable of mediating between the public
and a distant, increasingly complex state, the press had come by midcentury to
view itself as the community's representative and enforcer of public rights, capable
of unveiling and criticizing the state.54 "The right of the individual to know,"
Cooper asserted, is "coordinated with the right of his newspaper to tell him all the
news, except what the government was guilty of withholding and suppressing."ss
The original FOI campaign's goals were to transform that inchoate notion of
"guilt" into a legal wrong and to transform the abstract ideal of a "right" into an
enforceable cause of action for the individuals to whom it belonged.
the right to receive and impart information, the more specific provisions considered in the 1948
Convention on Freedom of Information, which both protected individuals from the state and allowed
states to support and protect their domestic press (for example, "in the interest of national safety" and to
"develop its national news enterprises"), faced significant opposition, not least from the U.S. delegation.
On the influence of the press on the U.S. delegation, see id. at 174-75.
54 James W. Carey, Journalism and Criticism: The Case of an Undeveloped Profession, 36 REV. OF POL.
227,231-33(1974).
5 COOPER, supra note 28, at 69.
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C The Political Enactment ofLegal Informational Rights
By the late 1940s, ASNE's Freedom of Information Committee, having been
frustrated in its efforts to formalize press freedoms in international law, 56 turned its
attention to press freedom in the U.S. and to one particular issue: government
secrecy. 7 Louisville Courier-Journal editor James Pope's term as Committee
chair, which started in 1950, proved integral to the organization's shift towards a
political fight against federal, state, and local government secrecy and in making
the fight against it explicitly political. Pope's committee began by organizing state-
level committees to help provide legal advocacy and defense on behalf of local
newspapers, and to serve as the basis for an effort to change federal policy.58 Pope
recruited Harold Cross, a retired media lawyer and journalism professor at
Columbia, to serve as the Committee's legal advisor.59 In this capacity, Cross
produced The People's Right to Know (1953), a book that both summarized the
patchwork of existing constitutional and administrative laws regulating government
secrecy and advocated for reforms to strengthen the public's access to
information.60
As Pope noted in his foreword to Cross' book, ASNE stood alongside Cross
as an "agent of the people" to enforce the people's right of access to information on
the public's behalf.61 In that role, Cross declared that the press would strike down
"the barriers to access to public records and proceedings," 62 which was especially
necessary, Pope noted, because citizens required assistance to understand an
"increasingly complex government." 63 The title Cross chose at once echoed the
rights concept from the press' earlier advocacy of press freedoms abroad and
56 See supra note 53.
5 DAVID R. DAVIES, THE POSTWAR DECLINE OF AMERICAN NEWSPAPERS, 1945-1965, at 31-38 (2006);
HERBERT N. FOERSTEL, FREEDOM OF INFORMATION AND THE RIGHT TO KNOW 14-18 (1999); Kennedy,
supra note 32, at 24-28; PITTS, supra note 33, at 172-73. While some press advocates complained about
government censorship during the war, see, e.g., Erwin D. Canham, The Battle for News, in
JOURNALISM IN WARTIME, supra note 30, at 44 (complaining about censorship, though conceding that
censorship in the U.S. during World War II was less onerous than in other countries), the press grew
more publicly exorcised about post-war secrecy.
58 Uhm, supra note 52, at 136-37.
s
9 Id. at 134-38.
60 HAROLD CROSS, THE PEOPLE'S RIGHT TO KNow (1953).
61 James S. Pope, Foreword to CROSS, supra note 60, at vii.
62 CROSS, supra note 60, at xiv.
63 Pope, supra note 61, at ix.
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framed the problem of secrecy as one of insufficiently enforced legal rights. The
book opened with the most prominent terms from the earlier free press campaign:
Public business is the public's business. The people have the right to know.
Freedom of information is their just heritage. Without that the citizens of a
democracy have but changed their kings.64
"Rights" against the state, along with the ideal of "freedom" from state
barriers to access, served as the logical way for a legal advocate like Cross to
champion transparency. But the prevailing law of access to government
information, Cross complained, was a mess; it existed only "where you find it," in
a "welter of varying statutes, conflicting court opinions and wordy departmental
regulations [that] present the problem as a veritable Chinese puzzle."65 The
resulting information-access law could not confront and control the expansion of
Cold War secrecy. Quoting a recent student-authored law review publication, Cross
lamented the fact that access to information was "a neglected constitutional
right," 66 and argued that it ought to be encompassed within First Amendment
protections. To that end, he cited a range of historical and contemporary figures for
support.67 His efforts to find a constitutional basis for the "right to know" have
proved unavailing, however, as the U.S. Supreme Court has never acknowledged
such a broad right to informational access in the Bill of Rights. Nevertheless,
6 CROSS, supra note 60, at xiii. Other books from the mid-1950s by prominent editors and activists in
the older international free press movement employed the term "right to know" as including the right of
access to information. COOPER, supra note 28, at 283-88; JAMES RUSSELL WIGGINS, FREEDOM OR
SECRECY 3-4 (1956). Following Cross, Wiggins-himself a former ASNE FOI Committee chair-
advocated establishing an enforceable right to know. Id. at 71. On Wiggins, see Uhm, supra note 52, at
138-39.
65 CROSS, supra note 60, at 4, 6, 10.
66 Note, Access to Official Information: A Neglected Constitutional Right, 27 IND. L.J. 209 (1952)
(relying largely on state court decisions and the statements of figures like James Madison and Thomas
Cooley to support its argument).
61 CROSS, supra note 60, at 129-32. Zechariah Chafee's 1947 treatise Government and Mass
Communications noted the problem of expanded secrecy in the post-war era but did not develop the
First Amendment argument that Cross would later pursue. I ZECHARIAH CHAFEE, JR., GOVERNMENT
AND MASS COMMUNICATIONS: A REPORT FROM THE COMMISSION ON FREEDOM OF THE PRESS 12-13
(1947). In Free Speech and Its Relation to Self-Government (1948), Alexander Meiklejohn included the
claim that the democratic values inherent in the First Amendment must allow the public access to
information, but he never specifically considers the relevance and problem of state information.
ALEXANDER MEIKLEJOHN, FREE SPEECH AND ITS RELATIONS TO SELF-GOVERNMENT 26,66, 89 (1948).
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academics and advocates, most prominently First Amendment scholar Thomas
Emerson, have repeated Cross' argument in the decades that followed.
As an alternative, Cross offered federal legislation as a second-best path to
legal rights. The Administrative Procedure Act, enacted in 1946, provided both a
model of statutory control over administrative agency operations and a potential
home for a freedom of information act. But it would require amendment, as its
existing information-access provisions were too vague and riddled with exceptions;
it also failed to create an enforceable public right to information that would allow
an aggrieved citizen (whether or not a member of the press) to seek judicial review
of a government entity's refusal to disclose information. To bridge this
substantive and procedural gap, Cross urged Congress to "begin exercising
effectually its function to legislate freedom of information for itself, the public, and
the press" by creating a legal right to know.70 Cross' argument certainly convinced
his ASNE sponsors; "[e]nlisted as an adviser," James Pope wrote, "he became our
leader."7 1
Soon after the publication of Cross' book in 1953, the ASNE Committee
finally found a potentially effective political government actor and partner for
establishing the legal rights that Cross described. In November 1954, a new
Democratic majority wrestled control of the U.S. House of Representatives back
from a small Republican majority that had ridden Dwight Eisenhower's coattails in
his 1952 election to a first presidential term. Although Eisenhower's moderate
68 Thomas I. Emerson, Legal Foundations of the Right to Know, 1976 WASH. U. L.Q. 1, 1-24 (1976). A
more recent legal academic advocate of the constitutional basis for an access right is Heidi Kitrosser,
who, like Cross and Emerson, has argued that access rights are a subset of free speech rights, whose
purpose is to enable democratic self-government and check government abuses. See Heidi Kitrosser,
Secrecy in the Immigration Courts and Beyond: Considering the Right To Know in the Administrative
State, 39 HARv. C.R.-C.L. L. REv. 95, 125-45 (2004). For more wide-ranging summaries of the human
rights-based arguments in favor of a right to information, see Ackerman & Sandoval-Ballesteros, supra
note 6, at 88-93, and Roy Peled & Yoram Rabin, The Constitutional Right to Information, 42 COLUM.
HUM. RTS. L. REv. 357, 359-73 (2011).
69 CROSS, supra note 60, at 223-25. The APA's original government information provision included
exceptions for information involved in "any function of the United States requiring secrecy in the public
interest" and allowed information not otherwise barred from disclosure by statute to be made available
by published rule "to persons properly and directly concerned except information held confidential for
good cause found." Id. at 226 (quoting 5 U.S.C.A. § 1002(1), 1002(c) (1946)). In addition to analyzing
the APA's weaknesses, Cross's book also listed all of the existing statutory exceptions from disclosure.
Id. at 231-34.
7o CROSS, supra note 60, at 246.
71 Pope, supra note 61, at xi.
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conservatism held at arm's length both Senator Joseph McCarthy (whose
prominence was fast receding by 1954) and his vice president Richard Nixon,
politics was politics, and the Executive Branch's expansion during the New Deal
and its administrative prerogative over government secrets following the end of
World War II constituted a source of political conflict. Democrats had controlled
the Presidency since Franklin Roosevelt's election in 1932; now, even with a
moderate war hero in the White House and a common enemy in the Soviet Union,
the Congress viewed its role vis-i-vis an electoral foe as both a principled,
institutional opposition to the Executive and a political opposition to a Republican.
To that end, the House of Representatives' Government Operations Committee,
chaired by Democratic Representative William Dawson of Illinois, established a
Special Subcommittee on Government Information, chaired by California
Representative John Moss, as a means to investigate Executive Branch secrecy.72
ASNE leaders and prominent newspaper editors played key roles in spurring
the Subcommittee that Moss chaired (referred to popularly as "the Moss
Committee") into action.73 The press provided personnel, with former journalists
dominating the Committee's staff, while prominent editors helped devise its
aggressive strategy of investigating federal agencies that kept information secret
from the press and public.74 ASNE provided legal advice by introducing Cross to
Moss and his Committee; Cross would play a key role as the Committee's legal
advisor until his death in 1959.75 The press also provided publicity, as newspapers
throughout the country promoted the Committee's work and especially its hearings
and investigations.76 And, through its lobbying and Cross's advice, the press helped
72 On the political nature of the Moss hearings (at least in their early years), see Sam Archibald, The
Early Years of the Freedom of Information Act-1955 to 1974, 26 PS: POL. SCI. & POL. 726 (1993);
Robert Okie Blanchard, The Moss Committee and a Federal Public Records Law, 1955-1965 (1966)
[hereinafter Blanchard, Federal Public Records Law] (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Syracuse
University) (on file with author); Richard G. Gray, Freedom of Access to Government Information (A
Study of the Federal Executive) (1964) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, University of Minnesota) (on
file with author). Dawson's appointment as chair of Government Operations in 1948 was contested,
especially by southern Democrats, in part because he was African American; one of his strengths was
his strong loyalty to party leadership. See CHRISTOPHER MANNING, WILLIAM L. DAWSON AND THE
LIMITS OF BLACK ELECTORAL LEADERSHIP 119-21 (2009).
7 Archibald, supra note 72, at 726-27.
74 Archibald, supra note 72, at 727; Blanchard, Federal Public Records Law, supra note 72, at 108-25;
Kennedy, supra note 32, at 64-73.
7 Kennedy, supra note 32, at 68-70, 94-96.
76 Robert 0. Blanchard, Present at the Creation: The Media and the Moss Committee, 1972
JOURNALISM Q. 271, 272-74 (1972) [hereinafter Blanchard, Present at the Creation].
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frame the issue for the Committee as one of insufficiently recognized and enforced
legal rights. In James Pope's words when he testified at the Moss Committee's first
hearing, "freedom of information is not a political issue.... The right to know is
the right of the people."7 7 Tellingly, Harold Cross' argument in favor of imposing
legal obligations through the creation of private statutory rights proved ultimately
to be the only satisfactory legislative solution to secrecy. After an amendment to
existing law failed to change bureaucratic norms, 78 the Freedom of Information
Act-a statute whose very title was apparently appropriated from the title of ASNE
member Herbert Brucker's 1949 book 79-finally gained sufficient legislative
support in 1966, cleared Congress's procedural hurdles, and was enacted despite
President Johnson's ambivalence (if not resigned hostility).so
The FOIA enacted a version of a "right to know" and pledged to protect the
informational "freedom" that had been first conceptualized and developed in the
early post-war and Cold War effort to instill Western democratic values abroad
through the ideal of a free, independent press. In its original enactment and in
subsequent amendments, Congress has continually recognized and proclaimed the
crucial role that the right to know and informational freedom play in a
democracy 8-legislative declarations that courts have consistently restated when
reviewing claims filed under the FOIA.82 The statute recognized an individual right
n Uhm, supra note 52, at 140; Kennedy, supra note 32, at 96.
7 See Gerald Wetlaufer, Justifying Secrecy: An Objection to the General Deliberative Privilege, 65 IND.
L.J. 845, 868-69 (1990). On the Subcommittee's frustrations with the inadequate results of its
successful amendment to the 1789 Housekeeping Statute under which executive agencies refused to
disclose documents, see FOERSTEL, supra note 57, at 33-35; Blanchard, Federal Public Records Law,
supra note 72, at 127-35; Kennedy, supra note 32, at 90-92.
7 Archibald, supra note 72, at 728; Blanchard, Present at the Creation, supra note 76, at 276; Kennedy,
supra note 32, at 69-70. After Cross's death, Jacob Scher, another media lawyer and journalism
professor, took his place as the Moss Committee's legal advisor and continued to follow Cross's
approach. Blanchard, Federal Public Records Law, supra note 72, at 89-91, 138-39.
so Archibald, supra note 72, at 729-30; Blanchard, Federal Public Records Law, supra note 72, at 167-
210.
" See H.R. REP. No. 89-1497, at 12 (1966), reprinted in 1966 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2418, 2429 ("A democratic
society requires an informed, intelligent electorate, and the intelligence of the electorate varies as the
quantity and quality of its information varies.").
82 See, e.g., NLRB v. Robbins Tire & Rubber Co., 437 U.S. 214, 242 (1978) ("[T]he basic purpose of
FOIA is to ensure an informed citizenry, vital to the functioning of a democratic society, needed to
check against corruption and to hold the governors accountable to the governed."); EPA v. Mink, 410
U.S. 73, 80 (1973) ("[FOIA was] broadly conceived.... to permit access to official information long
shielded unnecessarily from public view and . . . to create a judicially enforceable public right to secure
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to information and granted broad private rights to any person to seek judicial
enforcement of those rights-rights that were themselves balanced against the
state's need to keep some information from the public eye.83 Placing certain
procedural burdens on agencies and creating a private right of action for aggrieved
individuals, the FOIA delegated to the federal judiciary the task of protecting the
right and enforcing the duties. Working together, Congress and the press had
placed the right to know firmly within the institutional framework of the rule of
law: agencies would henceforth have to follow legislatively prescribed rules
enforced by the Judiciary, while the press would serve as a private enforcement
mechanism, harnessing this newly established right to hold the government
accountable and inform the public.
D. Conclusion: The Limits ofLaw
Traditional legal concepts-the judicial enforcement of individual rights and
those of the press-animated and grounded an American open-government
movement that viewed the state as a threat to democracy and press freedom. In its
actions against the state, the press worked with state actors-an ironic element in
any reformist, civil-libertarian movement and one that has remained consistent
from the World War II period through FOIA's enactment. 84 These efforts assumed
and helped constitute an institutional structure for these rights: the press, acting as
the public's agent, would advance and take advantage of the right to know;
Congress and the courts would play key roles in helping to enforce them; and
information would thereby be freed for the public to consume and act upon in its
members' role as democratic citizens. The rhetoric was broad and the terms
powerful because the stakes were so high. A democratic system demanded no less
than committed political advocacy, especially in the midst of a Cold War that
produced an enormous quantity of state secrets but that required a free and
independent press to remain legitimate and accountable.
such information from possibly unwilling official hands."), superseded by statute, 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(1),
as recognized in C.I.A. v. Sims, 471 U.S. 159 (1985).
83 Freedom of Information Act of 1966, Pub. L. No. 89-487, §§ (c), (e), 80 Stat. 250, 251 (requiring
agencies to make records available to "any person" and providing private right of action to challenge an
agency's refusal to disclose, while also enumerating exemptions to disclosure) (amended 1996).
g See DAVIES, supra note 57, at 32.
85 This campaign also represents the first instance in which the U.S. sought to export its ideals of press
freedoms abroad, an idea that would largely end with the shift towards fighting government secrecy; it
would later be resurrected in the 1990s, after the collapse of the Soviet Union. See CRAIG L. LAMAY,
EXPORTING PRESS FREEDOM: ECONOMIC AND EDITORIAL DILEMMAS IN INTERNATIONAL MEDIA
ASSISTANCE 76-84 (2007).
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The American FOIA is now merely one legislative enactment in a much
broader universe of legal rights and duties created by constitutional and legislative
mandates in order to advance some ideal or component of transparency. FOI
provisions regulate government activity around the world as well as in American
states and localities.86 The proliferation of legal rights has not created fully or, to
many in the transparency-advocacy community, even satisfactorily open
governments, as political, practical, and bureaucratic obstacles have obstructed the
state's visibility to the public.8 7 In the U.S., the annual Sunshine Week and
Freedom of Information Day events, established in 2005 to bring attention to
freedom of information laws, include a regular declaration that more must be done
to open government to the public's gaze.88 International FOI advocates express the
same frustration with other nations' compliance with their own laws.89 Even when
enacted, formal legal commands by themselves have not been able to overcome all
forms and instances of governmental resistance to disclosure, whether that
resistance is intended to hide corruption or incompetence, or as sincere efforts to
protect internal deliberative processes, or simply because officials find it easier and
less costly not to disclose information.
Despite these frustrations-or perhaps because of them-numerous FOI
NGOs still actively advocate for a classically liberal, rights-focused approach to
transparency and continue to view the press as the essential mediating institution
8 On the international FOI movement, see Lawrence Repeta, Mr. Madison in the Twenty-first Century:
Global Diffusion of the People's "Right to Know," in SOFT POWER SUPERPOWERS: CULTURAL AND
NATIONAL ASSETS OF JAPAN AND THE UNITED STATES 245, 250-55 (Watanabe Yasushi & David L.
McConnell eds., 2008); Thomas Blanton, The World's Right to Know, FOREIGN POL'Y, July-Aug. 2002,
at 50; Greg Michener, FOI Laws Around the World, 22 J. DEMOCRACY 145, 145-46 (2011). On state
FOI laws in the U.S., see 2 JAMES T. O'REILLY, FEDERAL INFORMATION DISCLOSURE § 27 (3d ed.
2010). For an introduction to the small universe of local FOI ordinances in the U.S., see Mark Fenster,
Local Transparency (May 10, 2008) (unpublished manuscript) (on file with author).
8 These frustrations began soon after FOIA's enactment. See JAMES BRIAN MCPHERSON, JOURNALISM
AT THE END OF THE AMERICAN CENTURY, 1965-PRESENT, at 50-51 (2006). On the difficulties of
achieving a fully transparent state, see Mark Fenster, Seeing the State: Transparency as Metaphor, 62
ADMIN. L. REv. 617 (2010) [hereinafter Fenster, Seeing the State].
88 See About Sunshine Week, SUNSHINE WEEK: YOUR RIGHT TO KNOw, http://www.sunshineweek.org/
About.aspx (last visited July 15, 2012).
89 See, e.g., Lalanath de Silva, Freedom ofInformation Laws Spreading Around the World, WORLD RES.
INST. (Sept. 26, 2010), http://www.wri.org/stories/2010/09/freedom-information-laws-spreading-
around-world (describing and celebrating new freedom of information laws but noting that "there is still
a lot that needs to be done to improve implementation of these laws. Our research has shown that
practice lags behind.").
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capable of enforcing legal rights and informing the public. 90 But in part as a
response to the frustrations that this resistance causes, and in part due to other
factors-including developments in information technology, changing conceptions
of the state, and the political economy of global commerce and international
financial institutions (IFIs)-some contemporary advocacy groups have broadened
their approach to understanding the asymmetric information problem, and
champion new approaches to transparency that look beyond formal law and its
enforcement. The remainder of this article outlines these alternative fixes to the
problem of government secrecy-fixes that either view legal reform as part of a
broader program or that abandon law altogether.
II. THE ADMINISTRATIVE AND INSTITUTIONAL Fix: ANTI-
CORRUPTION AS TRANSPARENCY
Although it prominently incorporates transparency in its name and holds the
transparency.org URL for its website, Transparency International (TI) is part of a
movement that views transparency as one among a diverse set of tools that can
achieve its larger goal of fighting corruption. TI puts transparency to work for a
more specific, substantive goal than the FOI movement, which focuses more
broadly on legal rights and a well-informed public. As this Part explains, TI
advocates traditional legal rights to information but concentrates its efforts on
building a transnational network of independent institutions that can fight
corruption and distribute information on government performance, and that
emphasizes economic development over democratic norms (without, to be sure,
ignoring democratic norms entirely).
Before discussing transparency's role as a concept and policy goal in this
movement, the movement and its more general project require some introduction.
The transnational anti-corruption movement that TI helped spark advocates on
behalf of administrative practices and institutional arrangements that can improve
the integrity of states and their economies. 9' It has both responded to and helped
9o See supra note 6. Some such organizations, such as the Reporters Committee for Freedom of the Press
(established in 1970) and the National Freedom of Information Coalition (established in 1989), have had
longstanding and institutional commitments to supporting the press and are led by executives and board
members from the institutional press and their legal representatives. See About The Reporters Committee
for Freedom of the Press: A Short History, THE REP. COMM. FOR FREEDOM OF THE PRESS, http://
www.rcfp.org/about.html (last visited July 15, 2012); About NFOIC, NAT'L FREEDOM OF INFO.
COALITION, http://www.nfoic.org/about-nfoic (last visited July 15, 2012); Board of Directors, NAT'L
FREEDOM OF INFO. COALITION, http://www.nfoic.org/board-directors (last visited Nov. 8, 2011).
91 On the then-nascent role of NGOs in the anti-corruption field, see SUSAN ROSE-ACKERMAN,
CORRUPTION AND GOVERNMENT 168-71 (1999). Transparency International's history as the core NGO
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spread the widely-held view that corruption, which it defines as "the abuse of
entrusted power for private gain,"92 constitutes a problem endemic to developing
nations and a leading cause of underdevelopment and poverty. For the anti-
corruption community, corruption's prevalence in the developing world helps
explain the failure of the post-Cold War era to meet the potential offered by the
global spread of democracy, the expansion of international trade, the privatization
of inefficient state-owned enterprises, and the wealth created by extractive
industries in resource-rich countries and regions.93 International financial
institutions have more recently adopted measures that not only reflect the
movement's influence but also suggest that IFIs themselves now act as part of the
movement in forcing transparency on foreign development and financing
projects.94
Together, TI and similar NGOs, along with the IFIs and intergovernmental
organizations that have come to emphasize anti-corruption as an integral reform to
political and economic development, form what anthropologist Steven Sampson
has characterized as an "anti-corruption industry"-a combined political movement
and social network composed of international and national elites that sponsors
conferences, policy reports, and journals, all in the name of promoting good
in this movement has been very well documented, both by TI members and by its critics. See Fredrik
Galtung & Jeremy Pope, The Global Coalition Against Corruption: Evaluating Transparency
International, in THE SELF-RESTRAINING STATE: POWER AND ACCOUNTABILITY IN NEW DEMOCRACIES
257 (Andreas Schedler, Larry Diamond & Marc F. Plattner eds., 1999) (account by TI's first managing
director and original staff member); Luis de Sousa & Peter Larmour, Transparency International:
Global Franchising and the War of Information Against Corruption, in RESEARCH COMPANION TO
CORRUPTION IN ORGANIZATIONS 269 (Ronald J. Burke & Cary L. Cooper eds., 2009) (critical account
of TI's history).
92 About Us, TRANSPARENCY INT'L, http://www.transparency.org/whoweare/organisation/faqs_on
corruption/2/ (last visited July 15, 2012).
9 See de Sousa & Larmour, supra note 91, at 270, 272.
94 Beginning in 1998, the International Monetary Fund began its own efforts to impose and evangelize in
favor of "fiscal transparency" in governments receiving IMF support. Manual on Fiscal Transparency:
Introduction, INT'L MONETARY FUND, http://www.imf.org/external/np/fad/trans/manuallintro.htm (last
visited July 15, 2012). In 2010, the World Bank implemented a new Public Access to Information
policy, representing what the Bank characterized as "a sea change" in its approach to information access
that would broaden disclosure and "allow for greater monitoring of Bank-supported projects, thereby
enabling better development results." News & Broadcast: World Bank Broadens Public Access to
Information, WORLD BANK (July 1, 2010), http://go.worldbank.org/L3HF51WOXO; see also Rebecca
Harris, Knowledge Is Power: Transparency and Participation Will Be the Drivers of Effective
Development, HUFFINGTON POST (Apr. 19, 2011), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/rebecca-
harris/knowledge-is-power-transp b 851020.html; Stephanie Strom, Cracking Open the World Bank,
N.Y. TIMES, July 3, 2011, at BU .
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governance in general and an understanding of "transparency" in particular." In its
international operations, the shared values and common discourse of its members,
and its exchange of information and services among members and with state
officials, this "industry" constitutes a "transnational advocacy network" akin to
those developed by human-rights, labor, and feminist activists.9 6 Representative of
the "new transnational activism" of global NGOs, TI and the anti-corruption
movement mobilize resources against state structures and officials by working
simultaneously at two distinct levels: rooting their efforts in specific national
contexts (through, for example, TI's chapters and other national and local NGOs),
while acting within transnational networks and furthering seemingly neutral,
international norms of transparency.97 Significantly, however, TI and its allies
depart from this broader trend by eschewing the "counterhegemonic" and rights-
focused, left-wing projects that those other networks attempt to further;98 instead,
the anti-corruption community works with established IFIs and other international
institutions to further the financial integration of developing nations within global
capitalism.99
9 Steven Sampson, The Anti-Corruption Industry: From Movement to Institution, 11 GLOBAL CRIME
261, 276-77 (2010). Prominent human rights NGOs with agendas that look beyond anti-corruption,
such as Amnesty International, have also begun to promote transparency campaigns. TI and Al
occasionally work together in broader campaigns to end human rights abuses and corruption. See, e.g.,
Middle East and North Africa Can End Legacy of Human Rights Abuse and Corruption, AMNESTY
INT'L (Mar. 11, 2011), http://www.amnesty.org/en/for-media/press-releases/middle-east-and-north-
africa-can-end-legacy-human-rights-abuse-and-corrupti (joint announcement by Al and TI calling for
new governments coalescing after the so-called Arab Spring to establish, among other things, "processes
for consultation and access to information that allow human rights activists and all other civil society
actors to participate fully and without fear in the building of systems and institutions of government").
6 MARGARET E. KECK & KATHRYN SIKKINK, ACTIVISTS BEYOND BORDERS: ADVOCACY NETWORKS IN
INTERNATIONAL POLITICS 2 (1998).
9 See SIDNEY TARROW, THE NEW TRANSNATIONAL ACTIVISM 28-29 (2005).
9 See Peter Evans, Counterhegemonic Globalization: Transnational Social Movements in the
Contemporary Global Political Economy, in THE HANDBOOK OF POLITICAL SOCIOLOGY: STATES, CIVIL
SOCIETIES, AND GLOBALIZATION 655, 656-58 (Thomas Janoski et al. eds., 2005); Philip McMichael,
Globalization, in HANDBOOK OF POLITICAL SOCIOLOGY, supra, at 587, 588-90. These
counterhegemonic movements have themselves been subject to important critiques from the left. See,
e.g., Janet Halley, Rape at Rome: Feminist Interventions in the Criminalization of Sex-related Violence
in Positive International Criminal Law, 30 MICH. J. INT'L L. 1, 4 (2009) (critiquing the international
feminist movement); David Kennedy, The International Human Rights Movement: Part of the
Problem?, 15 HARv. HUM. RTS. J. 101, 109-10 (2002) (critiquing international human rights
organizations); Kelly Rittich, Global Labour Policy as Global Social Policy, 14 CAN. LAB. & EMP. L.J.
227 (2008) (critiquing international labor organizations).
9 In this regard, the anti-corruption movement is decidedly not a "social movement" that would fall
within the sociological subfield that studies such movements-it is far more top-down than bottom-up,
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A. "Transparency" in Transparency International
TI was founded in 1993 under the leadership of former World Bank executive
Peter Eigen and thus was one of the first and most prominent non-governmental
members of the anti-corruption movement.' 00 It has expanded to include nearly one
hundred accredited national chapters that lobby and pressure public decision-
makers in the many countries in which it operates to adopt corruption control
instruments. 01 Lacking the power or leverage that international and regional
governing bodies-like the UN or the Organization of American States, and IFIs,
like the World Bank and IMF-enjoy, TI tries to use its professional networks and
moral authority to build coalitions among government, private-sector, and civil-
society institutions.102 In its overarching policy platform, TI prescribes a portfolio
of legal and structural measures that extend well beyond forcing the state to
disclose information to the public. 0 3 These strategies include using the
as its institutional relationship with the World Bank, see text accompanying supra note 94,
demonstrates. See Amy Kapczynski, The Access to Knowledge Mobilization and the New Politics of
Intellectual Property, 117 YALE L.J. 804, 806-07 n.2 (2008) (parsing definitions and noting that the
term transnational advocacy network is generally identified predominantly with "professionalized NGO
advocacy"); Michael McCann, Law and Social Movements: Contemporary Perspectives, 2 ANN. REV.
L. & Soc. Sci. 17, 23-24 (2006) (providing literature review of social movement theory and identifying
among its many themes a focus on movements led by and representing "nonelites whose social position
reflects relatively low degrees of wealth, prestige, or political clout" and a use of disruptive protests and
other tactics "that halt or upset ongoing social practices").
1oo Galtung & Pope, supra note 91, at 258. TI's founding coincided with, and helped spur, the
development in the mid- to late-1990s of an international consensus among IFIs and other state and non-
state entities to view corruption as a preeminent obstruction to economic development. See James Thuo
Gathii, Defining the Relationship Between Human Rights and Corruption, 31 U. PA. J. INT'L L. 125,
144-45 (2009). It also coincided with the beginning of a period in the history of NGOs in which NGOs
were increasingly active and influential in international policymaking. See Steve Chamovitz, Two
Centuries of Participation: NGOs and International Governance, 18 MICH. J. INT'L L. 183, 265-68
(1997).
101 Galtung & Pope, supra note 91, at 260; de Sousa & Larmour, supra note 91, at 270, 273-77; Luis de
Sousa, TI in Search of a Constituency: The Institutionalization and Franchising of the Global Anti-
Corruption Doctrine, in GOVERNMENTS, NGOs AND ANTI-CORRUPTION: THE NEW INTEGRITY
WARRIORS 186, 194-96 (Luis de Sousa, Peter Larmour & Barry Hindess eds., 2009).
102 Kenneth W. Abbott & Duncan Snidal, Values and Interests: International Legalization in the Fight
Against Corruption, 31 J. LEGAL STUD. S141, S165-66 (2002); Peter Eigen, Measuring and Combating
Corruption, 5 J. POL'Y REF. 187, 190 (2002); A Statement of Vision, Values and Guiding Principles for
Transparency International, TRANSPARENCY INT'L (Oct. 16, 2011), http://www.transparency.org/
whoweare/accountability/a_statement of visionvalues andguiding_principles for til2/.
103 The anti-corruption movement of which TI is a part intersects with broader international movements
promoting good governance, democracy promotion, economic development, and state building. Steven
Sampson, Corruption and Anti-Corruption in Southeast Europe: Landscapes and Sites, in
GOVERNMENTs, NGOs AND ANTI-CORRUPTION, supra note 101, at 170.
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organization's institutional structures, which produce research and model reforms
and build networks among states, IFIs, and other NGOs, to lobby and pressure for
various reforms. TI and the broader anti-corruption movement encourage states to
enact and enforce ethical standards among officials and corporations contracting
with governments, to offer higher salaries to government employees, to privatize
state-owned enterprises and services, and to enact laws and develop norms that
promote transparency and thereby bring corrupt practices to light.'0
With the prominent position that it plays in the name of one of the most
widely recognized anti-corruption NGOs, transparency enjoys special status among
the package of good-government reforms that the movement promotes.los TI
advocates on transparency's behalf both by lobbying for rights-based legal reforms
(whether at the national level or via the enforcement of international conventions)
and by collecting and distributing information about government performance. As
it states on its website,
Transparency International supports the international efforts to have the right of
access to information recognised and respected. The exercise of this right
enables citizens to keep their governments and public bodies accountable. This
can hinder corrupt practices that benefit from opaque or obscure regimes.'o0
TI also collects and publicizes information about corrupt practices, most
prominently in its Corruption Perception Index (CPI). 107 The CPI is an "aggregate
indicator" that uses assessments and business opinion surveys to gauge the extent
of a nation's corruption and the extent of its anti-corruption efforts in the public
104 Ed Brown & Jonathan Cloke, Neoliberal Reform, Governance and Corruption in the South:
Assessing the International Anti-Corruption Crusade, 36 ANTIPODE 272, 275-77 (2004); Galtung &
Pope, supra note 91, at 261-74.
105 See Margaret Hanson, The Global Promotion of Transparency in Emerging Markets, 9 GLOBAL
GOVERNANCE 63, 66-68 (2003). To its great credit, TI also has also attempted aggressively to disclose
the sources of their own funding-a practice that other transparency-focused NGOs have adopted. See
Frequently Asked Questions about Transparency International, TRANSPARENCY INT'L, http://
www.transparency.org/whoweare/organisation/faqsontransparency intemational/2/ (last visited
July 15, 2012) (explaining how TI is funded and how its national chapters are financed independently);
see also How We Are Funded, EXTRACTIVE INDUS. TRANSPARENCY INITIATIVE, http://eiti.org/
about/funding (last visited Nov. 8, 2011).
1o6 The Role of Information in Fighting Corruption, TRANSPARENCY INT'L, http://archive
.transparency.org/global priorities/access information (last visited July 15, 2012).
1o7 For a list and description of TI's full range of reports, see Publications, TRANSPARENCY INT'L,
http://www.transparency.org/whatwedo/publications/ (last visited July 15, 2012).
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sector. It then scores each nation on a ten-point scale that allows comparisons
across countries.'os It has become TI's signature product and a key element of its
brand identity.109 TI's approach has served as a model for new entrants in the anti-
corruption field, which use similar approaches to protect developing nations from
corrupt practices in the extractive industries (where corruption is often endemic)110
or to offer an index of laws and government practices that competes with and
complements TI's CPI. 11
If the anti-corruption industry adapts, at least in part, a traditional rights-based
strategy for opening government, its focus on the economic and political effects of
corruption distinguishes its understanding and use of transparency as an issue. The
industry views NGO-produced measures that force disclosure on state actors-like
the other good-governance measures that it advocates-as a means to make a
nation's government more ethical, its markets more efficient, and its economy
more robust. It thereby reverses the FOI movement's assumptions about
transparency's primacy in democratic theory and practice: rather than
understanding law as a means to make the state transparent and therefore more
democratic (with the help of the private press), the anti-corruption movement views
transparency and the international NGOs that define and enforce it as the means to
reach an economic and administrative goal-the end of official corruption-that
will ultimately reform a nation's political system. Although its name has played a
1os Corruption Perceptions Index 2010, TRANSPARENCY INT'L, http://www.transparency.org/policy
research/surveysindices/cpi/2010/results (2010).
109 See Staffan Andersson & Paul M. Heywood, The Politics of Perception: Use and Abuse of
Transparency International's Approach to Measuring Corruption, 57 POL. STUD. 746, 747 (2009).
110 The most prominent extractive-industry NGOs are the Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative,
founded in 2002 and funded by the private sector, supporting countries, civil-society organizations, and
its host government, Norway, and Publish What You Pay, also founded in 2002 and formed and initially
funded by NGOs and foundations. See EXTRACTIVE INDUS. TRANSPARENCY INITIATIVE, http://eiti.org
(last visited Nov. 15, 2011); PUBLISH WHAT YOU PAY, http://www.publishwhatyoupay.org (last visited
July 15, 2012). Their campaigns attempt to force companies to, as the name states, "publish what [they]
pay" for the right to extract, in order to make such transactions more transparent.
"1 A recent entrant in the field is Global Integrity (GI), begun in 1999 within the Center for Public
Integrity (a U.S. domestic investigative journalism NGO) and then spinning off independently in 2005,
with a mission to "play a catalytic role in promoting accountability and transparency reforms by
developing tools that address the needs of the public, private, and civil sectors equally." Global
Integrity's Mission, GLOBAL INTEGRITY, http://www.globalintegrity.org/about/mission (last visited
July 15, 2012). Rather than studying perceptions of corruption like TI, GI assesses anti-corruption
mechanisms, openness, and government accountability to understand not what it describes as the
"disease of corruption" but "the medication applied against it: the public policies, institutions, and
practices that deter, prevent, or punish corruption." Our Story, GLOBAL INTEGRITY,
http://www.globalintegrity.org/about/story (last visited July 15, 2012).
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key role in the emergence of "transparency" as the term that signifies open
government, TI neither seeks transparency for its own democratic sake nor
privileges it as the most important tool on the role to a legitimate state. Instead, TI
promotes the consequential value of openness as a means to fight corruption.
B. The Contestable Claims of the Institutional Anti-Corruption
Fix
TI's fight against corruption and on transparency's behalf has not gone
unchallenged. Critics argue that despite its seemingly precise, quantitative, and
unambiguous calculation of corruption, TI's CPI relies on imprecise perceptions
and flawed sampling and survey methodologies.1 12 They also claim that the
anticorruption movement furthers Western, technocratic conceptions of governance
and a neoliberal vision of a minimal state;" 3 as applied in the nations that the CPI
identifies as suffering from corruption, anti-corruption programs shrink the size of
government and limit its functions while expanding institutional and legal
accountability regimes.1 14 In the process, seemingly universal ideals of a good
government, developed and promoted by Western NGOs funded by Western
governments and foundations, 15 are imposed on distinct political, economic, and
social systems of individual nations. These prescriptions prioritize "good
government" over popular democracy and effective, legitimate policy for the entire
112 The CPI's seeming precision in reducing a complex phenomenon to an ordinal rating is a key feature
that helps win it media attention when TI releases it annually. See de Sousa & Larmour, supra note 91,
at 277-78. For criticisms of the CPI, see Andersson & Heywood, supra note 109, at 752-54;
CHRISTIANE ARNDT & CHARLES OMAN, OECD DEV. CTR., USES AND ABUSES OF GOVERNANCE
INDICATORS 91-92 (2006). Critics of the extractive industries similarly charge that indices such as that
produced by the Extractive Industry Transparency Initiative enable mining and oil companies to appear
ethical while they seek additional rents from resource-rich nations and hide profits through corporate
subsidiaries and tax havens. See NNIMMO BASSEY, To COOK A CONTINENT: DESTRUCTIVE EXTRACTION
AND CLIMATE CRISIS IN AFRICA 35-39 (2011); Khadija Sharife, "Transparency" Hides Zambia's Lost
Billions, AL JAZEERA ENG. (June 18, 2011, 3:43 PM), http://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/opinion/
2011/06/20116188244589715.html.
"3 For a broader critique of NGOs' role in promoting a neo-liberal globalization, see JEAN-FRANQOIS
BAYART, GLOBAL SUBJECTS: A POLITICAL CRITIQUE OF GLOBALIZATION 58-67 (2007).
114 TI's rise has run concurrently with the rise of New Public Management (also known as New
Governance), whose emphasis on accountability has proven especially attractive to the diverse political
interests that advocate for public fiscal restraint, particularly in the provision of public services. See
MICHAEL POWER, THE AUDIT SOCIETY: RITUALS OF VERIFICATION 43-44 (1997).
" See Frequently Asked Questions About TI, TRANSPARENCY INT'L, http://transparency.org/news
room/faq/faq_ti ("The bulk of TI's income comes from government development agency budgets and
foundations. Other sources of income include project funds from international organisations, donations
from private sector companies and income from honoraria and publications.").
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nation, while the pursuit of these ideals limits the range of political issues that
voters and their elected representatives can decide."' The CPI thus acts as a
disciplining technology, one whose seeming, but imperfect, neutrality and basis in
the administrative norm of transparency constitutes a form of unelected "organized
governance" on states and their agencies while it hides its more normative,
programmatic functions." 7 Representing ideas developed elsewhere, and wielding
powerful, seemingly objective indices to advocate for government reform, TI and
international anti-corruption advocates appear unaccountable to local citizens and
publics-even as they would claim to be furthering the crucial political and public
goal of fighting official corruption." 8
TI responds to such critiques by arguing that ending the easy cases of clear
corruption (e.g., the official with the Swiss bank account) are the main,
116 See Brown & Cloke, supra note 104, at 285; Staffan Andersson & Paul M. Heywood, Anti-
Corruption as a Risk to Democracy: On the Unintended Consequences of International Anti-Corruption
Campaigns, in GOVERNMENTS, NGOs AND ANTI-CORRUPTION, supra note 98, at 33-34; Barry Hindess,
Good Government and Corruption, in CORRUPTION AND ANTI-CORRUPTION 1, 5-7 (Peter Larmour &
Nick Wolanin eds., 2001); Barry Hindess, International Anti-Corruption as a Programme of
Normalization, in GOVERNMENTS, NGOs AND ANTI-CORRUPTION, supra note 101, at 19-32 [hereinafter
Hindess, Normalization]; Peter Larmour, Corruption and the Concept of "Culture": Evidence from the
Pacific islands, 49 CRIME, L. & Soc. CHANGE 225, 237 (2009). For a classic study of the unintended
negative consequences of imposing anti-corruption reforms, see FRANK ANECHIARICO & JAMES B.
JACOBS, THE PURSUIT OF ABSOLUTE INTEGRITY: How CORRUPTION CONTROL MAKES GOVERNMENT
INEFFECTIVE (1996).
117 See Andersson & Heywood, supra note 109; Brown & Cloke, supra note 104; see also JON
BEASLEY-MURRAY, POSTHEGEMONY: POLITICAL THEORY AND LATIN AMERICA 107-08 (2011)
(critiquing transparency's transformative power on the state and society, and its relationship to
neoliberalism); POWER, supra note 114, at 6-8 (noting the distinction in financial accounting between
technological, or operational, elements of auditing practices and programmatic, or normative, elements,
while both problematizing the idea that technology is neutral and noting how its seeming neutrality
obfuscates the programmatic nature of the practice). For a critique of how seemingly neutral standards
serve as normative efforts to control behavior and organize governance, see NILS BRUNSSON & BENGT
JACOBSSON, The Contemporary Expansion of Standardization, in A WORLD OF STANDARDS 1, 10
(2000); Haridimos Tsoukas, The Tyranny of Light: The Temptations and Paradoxes of the Information
Society, 29 FUTURES 827, 831 (1997).
118 For criticism of NGOs as unrepresentative of local populations and unaccountable to national
political systems, see Kenneth Anderson & David Rieff, "Global Civil Society": A Sceptical View, in
GLOBAL CIVIL SOCIETY 2004/05, at 26, 29-30 (Helmut Anheier et al. eds., 2005); Ruth W. Grant &
Robert 0. Keohane, Accountability and Abuses ofPower in World Politics, 99 AM. POL. SCI. REv. 29,
37-38 (2005); Peter J. Spiro, New Global Potentates: Nongovernmental Organizations and the
"Unregulated" Marketplace, 18 CARDOzO L. REV. 957, 963 (1996); see also Steve Charnovitz,
Nongovernmental Organizations and International Law, 100 AM. J. INT'L L. 348, 365-68 (2006)
(agreeing with Anderson and Rieff in part, but arguing that "more open and inclusive processes of
decision making can help to overcome the allegedly attenuated democratic legitimacy of international
governance").
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uncontroversial purpose of its work,"' and that it allows its locally situated
national chapters to define corruption in more difficult cases.120 In other words,
eradicating clear cases of corruption is not political, and the organization leaves a
broad array of political and regulatory options open to its locally accountable and
informed members. But anti-corruption efforts do not simply seek to identify and
punish wrongdoers; they also advocate, implicitly or explicitly, broader structural
reforms. And if corruption is defined narrowly as rent-seeking behavior by public
officials, then privatization and deregulation-reform strategies that can apply in
any setting-simultaneously reduce the potential for corruption and make the state
ostensibly more transparent by making it smaller.121 To the extent that TI and the
anti-corruption movement market these reforms as administrative, technocratic
improvements provided by independent, non-state institutions, their efforts seem to
promote neutral, common-sense tools that can transform states into leaner, more
efficient institutions-states that can both be held accountable to a Western model
cognizable to NGOs and IFIs and be more attractive to direct foreign investment.122
These seemingly neutral principles are the very problem that TI represents for its
critics, who view the NGO as either a witting or unwitting agent of a global
neoliberal regime that undercuts state sovereignty and local control.123
"Transparency," for TI and the anti-corruption movement generally, functions both
as a transcendent and neutral administrative norm to which all reasonable people
can subscribe and as the basis for a normative political apparatus that plays a key
role in the structural readjustment of national political, economic, and
administrative systems. One need not fully agree with commentators who are
critical of the anti-corruption movement in order to view the powerful normative
"' Frequently Asked Questions About Corruption, TRANSPARENCY INT'L, http://www.transparency.org/
whoweare/organisation/faqs on corruption/2/ (last visited July 21, 2012).
120 d.
121 Brown & Cloke, supra note 104, at 286-87.
122 Hanson, supra note 105, at 63; Hindess, Normalization, supra note 116, at 23; Mark Philp, Modelling
Political Corruption in Transition, in DIMENSIONEN POLITISCHER KORRUPTION: BEITRAOGE ZUM
STAND DER INTERNATIONALEN FORSCHUNG 91,96 (2005).
123 On transparency's relationship to global neoliberalism, see ZYGMUNT BAUMAN, GLOBALIZATION:
THE HUMAN CONSEQUENCES 29-33 (1998) (characterizing the expert imposition of transparency as a
means to ease administration over differentiated, local cultures); Christina Garsten & Monica Lindh de
Montoya, The Naked Corporation: Visualization, Veiling and the Ethico-Politics of Organizational
Transparency, in TRANSPARENCY IN A NEW GLOBAL ORDER, supra note 15, at 79, 90-91 (describing
transparency as a seemingly moral, apolitical means to "mak[e] the globalizing world hospitable for
trans-organizational, transnational and sometimes super-national interventions and administrative
procedures").
THE TRANSPARENCY Fix
PAGE | 477
role that the movement plays in the political economy of good governance reforms
that are promoted, sometimes coercively, by international institutions.
C. Conclusion: The Limits of the Institutional Anti-Corruption
Fix
An open, visible state is one aspect, albeit a key one, in TI's broader critique
of governing regimes around the world and its normative vision for a leaner, more
accountable, and efficient state. The problem TI and the broader movement
principally address is corruption, not a democratic deficit created and fostered by
official secrecy or a political right that the state is ignoring or under-enforcing.
They pursue reform as a means to extend the larger structural, historical change of
which they are a part: the expansion and movement of global capital and finance to
fund economic development as it is understood and championed by Western states.
TI and its institutional colleagues thus hold a primarily consequentialist vision of
transparency, one in which transparency's democratic effects flow from better,
non-corrupt governance rather than from the enforcement of the public's right of
access to information as such.124
It is a vision whose suspicion about the state and law are more pronounced
than in the earlier FOI movement. If the state is corrupt, it will not enact laws to
force itself to disclose information, and if the corrupt state has such laws, it will
under-enforce them. Like other transnational NGOs, TI thus attempts to work
around the state by helping to construct an institutional network of organizations
that can force the state to disclose informationl25 and affect international law and
norms.126 With its international organization and national chapters, as well as its
relationships with influential IFIs, developed nations, and private firms, TI relies
for reform on a far more complex set of institutional actors than the administrative
procedures and judicial review that the traditional FOI movement envisions.
Furthermore, its reliance upon local chapters recognizes that its program will vary
in different countries, based on local political, legal, and institutional conditions. TI
thus hopes to further a transnational ideal of non-corrupt governance without
necessarily seeking to impose a transcendent legal right of public access to
124 On consequentialist arguments in transparency's favor, see Fenster, supra note 3, at 899-902.
125 This process, in which local activists whose work is blocked by the state seek assistance from
international NGOs whose headquarters are elsewhere to provide external pressure, is referred to as the
"boomerang" effect in the literature on transnational activism. See KECK & SIKKINK, supra note 96, at
12-13; TARROW, supra note 97, at 145-46.
126 See Steve Chamovitz, Nongovernmental Organizations and International Law, 100 AM. J. INT'L L.
348, 361-63 (2006).
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information-the ideal of a constitutional and human right that should allow no
national variance.
These distinctions reflect the quite different historical context from which the
anti-corruption movement emerged. The Cold War had ended by the time TI began,
removing world communism as the main threat to the developing world and
reshaping the bipolar geopolitics that the West and East had seemed to inhabit. But
corruption serves an analogous role to TI in post-communist, failed, and
developing states as the Soviet threat did to ASNE and free press advocates
focused on the immediate post-war world. Economic development has replaced
democratic development as the preeminent concern, and administration and
governance that can attract foreign capital and IFI loans and investment serve the
role that legal informational rights and a free press played and continue to play for
the FOI movement.
III. THE TECHNOLOGICAL Fix: DIGITAL TRANSPARENCY
FOI advocates view government information asymmetry and hoarding
primarily as creating state secrecy and as correctable with a legal solution. TI and
other anti-corruption advocates view the same problem as a largely administrative
one caused by official corruption, which an institutional solution can solve. Digital-
transparency advocates view the same problem primarily as one of the flow and
accessibility of data, which can be solved through information technology. In their
solution, code and networked communication substitute for or augment the legal
rights and duties that officials routinely ignore and courts insufficiently enforce,
effectively and efficiently moving government information from hard drives and
other storage media to the public. Reframing the problem that transparency must
solve from law to code leads digital advocates to prescribe a smaller role for the
state (as well as for the institutional press) than the earlier advocacy movement and
a much larger role for an active, participatory citizenry and an entrepreneurial class
of visionaries and software designers. Although some digital-transparency NGOs
attempt to further the more traditional aims of the FOI movement,127 the
127 The Sunlight Foundation, for example, has established a wide range of online programs that overlap
with traditional freedom of information and campaign finance disclosure laws, and is focused especially
on making congressional operations more visible via the Internet. See Issues by Topic, SUNLIGHT
FOUND., http://sunlightfoundation.com/aboutlissues/ (last visited July 21, 2012) (listing the projects it is
pursuing, which includes disclosing congressional earmarks, participating in the FOI campaign's
Sunshine Week and Freedom of Information Day, and attempting to increase the transparency of
lobbyists' influence); see also Schacter, supra note 18, at 651 (discussing Sunlight Foundation
programs). Micah Sifry, co-founder of the Personal Democracy Forum, similarly views at least part of
the NGO's purpose as using digital information and networking technology to take advantage of and
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movement's innovation lies in its distinct efforts to free government data and allow
information to move freely between state and public.
A. Digital Transparency and the Technological Transformation
of State and Public
The rhetoric that digital-technology advocates deploy is remarkably powerful,
continuing a tradition established in the writings that heralded the emergence of
cyberspace. 128 The foremost collection advocating this position, entitled Open
Government: Collaboration, Transparency, and Participation in Practice (2010)
and issued by the technology book publisher O'Reilly,129 includes essays
proclaiming that the revolutionary changes wrought by information technology can
tame and make usable the data collected and produced by sprawling government
bureaucracies. The book's contributors provide a representative sampling of the
movement's composition and leadership: NGO executives and staff,
entrepreneurial software programmers as well as executives and in-house
intellectuals at Microsoft and IBM, academics (both faculty and enterprising
students), consultants, and several government officials from federal agencies and
congressional staff as well as from state and local government. The Internet, the
book's foreword states, can and will produce a state that
opens its doors to the world; co-innovates with everyone, especially citizens;
shares resources that were previously closely guarded; harnesses the power of
mass collaboration; drives transparency throughout its operations; and behaves
further the spirit of FOI laws. See MICAH L. SIFRY, WIKILEAKS AND THE AGE OF TRANSPARENCY 105-
34 (2011).
128 See generally PATRICE FLICHY, THE INTERNET IMAGINAIRE (2007) (documenting the utopian claims
made on the Internet's behalf, especially in the early 1990s); FRED TURNER, FROM COUNTERCULTURE
TO CYBERCULTURE 249-62 (2005) (providing an intellectual history of the utopian claims about
cyberspace and the Internet); Philip Agre, The Market Logic of Information, 13 KNOWLEDGE, TECH. &
POL'Y 67 (2000); Richard Barbrook & Andy Cameron, The Californian Ideology, 6 SCL AS CULTURE
44, 67 (1996) (offering a relatively early critique of cyber-utopianism); Julie E. Cohen, Cyberspace
As/And Space, 107 COLUM. L. REv. 210, 215-19 (2007) (summarizing the utopian strain in cyberspace
advocacy). The classic example is John Perry Barlow, The Economy ofldeas, WIRED, Mar. 1994, at 84,
89, 129 (reiterating, explaining, and making famous Stewart Brand's claim that "information wants to
be free," and predicting that "[tihe [intellectual property] protections that we will develop will rely far
more on ethics and technology than on law").
'9 OPEN GOVERNMENT: COLLABORATION, TRANSPARENCY, AND PARTICIPATION IN PRACTICE (Daniel
Lathrop & Laurel Ruma eds., 2010) [hereinafter OPEN GOVERNMENT].
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not as an isolated department or jurisdiction, but as something new-a truly
integrated and networked organization.130
This new state will surely be leaner and more efficient; moreover, as it "co-
innovates," "shares resources," collaborates, "drives transparency," integrates, and
networks, it will also act in a less hidebound, formally bureaucratic way.
Such ideals suggest administrative and technical commitments that parallel
the open source code movement. In his key chapter in the aforementioned digital-
transparency book (published by the company he founded), Tim O'Reilly offers a
series of "lessons" from the open source community and technology industry that
he argues apply directly to government: use open, simple programming standards;
design information technology to foster participation; and enable end users to mine
and aggregate data the state collects.131 "Just as open source software allows users
to change and contribute to the source code of their software," the book's editors
note in its preface, "open government now means government where citizens not
only have access to information, documents, and proceedings, but can also become
participants in a meaningful way." 32 The technology and process of open source,
advocates argue, will increase the state's visibility and ability to collaborate with
the public.133 Its ability to evoke among technophiles technical competence, open
design, and collaborative process also allows "open source" to serve as the key
metaphor among popular political theorists who deploy it in such concepts as
"open-source democracy," 34 "open-source politics,"' 35 and "next generation
democracy." 36
130 Don Tapscott, Foreword to OPEN GOVERNMENT, supra note 129, at xvi.
1' Tim O'Reilly, Government as Platform, in OPEN GOVERNMENT, supra note 129, at I1, 15-24,32-34.
132 Daniel Lathrop & Laurel Ruma, Preface to OPEN GOVERNMENT, supra note 129, at xix, xix.
133 Danielle Keats Citron, Open Code Governance, 2008 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 355, 371-87; cf LAWRENCE
LESSIG, CODE: VERSION 2.0, at 153 (2006) ("[Open code] functions as a kind of Freedom of Information
Act for network regulation. As with ordinary law, open code requires that lawmaking be public, and
thus that lawmaking be transparent.").
" See DOUGLAS RUSHKOFF, OPEN SOURCE DEMOCRACY: How ONLINE COMMUNICATION IS
CHANGING OFFLINE POLITICS (2003), available at http://www.gutenberg.org/catalog/world/
readfile?fk files=1477887.
' See Micah Sifry, The Rise of Open-Source Politics, NATION, Nov. 4, 2004, at 14, available at
http://www.thenation.com/article/rise-open-source-politics.
136 See JARED DUVAL, NEXT GENERATION DEMOCRACY: WHAT THE OPEN-SOURCE REVOLUTION
MEANS FOR POWER, POLITICS, AND CHANGE (2010).
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That degree of productivity and enthusiasm about newly emergent
technological possibilities brims over in events like TransparencyCamp, an annual
event held outside Washington, D.C., where "government officials, technologists,
journalists and advocates [come together] to share their knowledge about how best
to use new technologies and policies to make our government really work for the
people."' 3 7 A project of the Sunlight Foundation, a leading digital-transparency
NGO, the Camp's 2011 "unconference" was sponsored by Microsoft (on whose
Maryland campus the event was held), Google, O'Reilly Publishing, Governing
magazine, Adobe, and Forum One Communications (a "digital communications
firm" that develops internet strategies for, among others, NGOs and government
agencies). Scheduled sessions in 2011 included varied topics like "Building an
Open Financial Datamart," "Breaking the Information Cartel in Congress," and
"Open Data in Municipal Government for Fun and Profit." 39 As one activist
described it in a video posted on the Sunlight Foundation website, "It's a beautiful
citizen uprising, but it's not an uprising which says we've come here to destroy or
tear you down, it's an uprising that says we've come here to help you be more
efficient." 40 Led by young activists and visionary officials, the TransparencyCamp
"uprising" is built upon and via the hardware, software, and search engines of its
eminent corporate sponsors.
Coupling rhetorical verve with organizational energy, digital-transparency
advocates posit that the state and public can engage in ongoing, two-way
communication-a much broader and bolder vision than the FOI movement's more
restrained idea that the public's right to know will increase government
accountability and improve bureaucratic performance. Before, "information"
needed to be "freed" to the public via the press; now, as usable data, it can, must,
and will flow freely and cheaply in all directions, using technology that allows two-
way access to the state.141 Data running freely can move from the state as well as to
' About Transparency Camp, TRANSPARENCY CAMP, http://transparencycamp.org/ (last visited Nov. 9,
2011); Sponsors, TRANSPARENCY CAMP, http://transparencycamp.org/sponsors/ (last visited Nov. 9,
2011).
38 Sponsors, supra note 137.
' Schedule, TRANSPARENCY CAMP, http://transparencycamp.org/sessions/ (last visited July 21, 2012).
140 TransparencyCamp 2011, video embedded in Laurenellen McCann, TCamp: Looking Back and
Looking Forward, SUNLIGHT FOUND. BLOG (May 12, 2011, 1:18 PM), http://sunlightfoundation.com/
blog/2011/05/12/tcamp-looking-back-and-looking-forward/.
1' See, e.g., BETH SIMONE NOVECK, WIKI GOVERNMENT: How TECHNOLOGY CAN MAKE
GOVERNMENT BETTER, DEMOCRACY STRONGER, AND CITIZENS MORE POWERFUL, at xii-xiii (2009)
(characterizing the ideal of "open government" as concerning both data access and collaboration with
the public).
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it; the public can both pull information from the state and push data and opinions to
it. A digital world thus should enable unmediated, interactive communication
between state and citizens, an ideal that digital technology NGOs like the Sunlight
Foundation and the Personal Democracy Forum embrace. 142
Digital transparency's ideals dovetail with, and could even advance, the main
administrative reform movements of the past several decades.143 Like the
deregulatory "new public management" movement,'" digital transparency
imagines citizens as consumers who can use government data to make better
market decisions, and views private entities as capable of improving upon or
replacing state-created public goods and services.145 Similarly, in its effort to have
government collaborate with private citizens and institutions in designing
regulatory programs and public-service provisions,146 digital transparency also
parallels and incorporates "new govemance" ideals.147
142 See, e.g., SIFRY, supra note 127, at 15-17 (editor and curator of the Personal Democracy Forum,
praising the "Age of Transparency" in an era of networked communication, in which social media and
so-called "crowd-sourced" information are viewed as inexorably changing the shape of the government
and its relationship to its citizens); Sunlight Agenda 2011, SUNLIGHT FOUND., http://
sunlightfoundation.com/policy/documents/agenda/ (last visited July 21, 2012) ("Today, our newly
networked citizenry has rising expectations of greatly expanded access to governmental information, so
that it may play a fuller role in understanding, evaluating and participating in the workings of its
government. More open and transparent government can foster more competent and trustworthy
behavior by public officials along with a more engaged public.").
143 See generally Jennifer Shkabatur, Cities @ Crossroads: Digital Technology and Local Democracy in
America, 76 BROOK. L. REV. 1413, 1443-64 (2011).
'" See generally Christopher Ansell & Jane Gingrich, Reforming the Administrative State, in
DEMOCRACY TRANSFORMED? 164, 165-66 (Bruce E. Cain et al. eds., 2003) (summarizing "the neo-
liberal agenda" of New Public Management reforms in attempting "to apply the discipline of the market
to government"); see also supra note 114 (associating TI with New Public Management).
145 See Justin Longo, #OpenData: Digital-Era Governance Thoroughbred or New Public Management
Trojan Horse?, PUB. POL'Y & GOVERNANCE REV., Spring 2011, at 38, 41-44 (noting the extent to
which digital transparency ideals share those of New Public Management), available at http://
ppgr.files.wordpress.com/2ll/05/longo-ostry.pdf.
146 See, e.g., NOVECK, supra note 141, at 18-20 (developing a "collaborative vision of democratic
theory" and egalitarian, democratic participation via information technology), 38-44 (defining and
outlining a vision of "collaborative democracy" in a "Wiki Government"); Beth Noveck, Defining Open
Government, CAIRNS BLOG (Apr. 14, 2011, 12:57 PM), http://caims.typepad.com/blog/2011/04/whats-
in-a-name-open-gov-we-gov-gov-20-collaborative-govemment.html (blog entry posted soon after
Noveck left the Obama administration, in which she defined open government as one that uses "network
technology to connect the public to government and to one another informed by open data" in order to
"ask[] for help with solving problems").
14 For a recent summary of new governance, see Jason M. Solomon, Law and New Governance in the
21st Century Regulatory State, 86 TEx. L. REv. 819, 823-37 (2008).
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Government administrations have incorporated the movement's ideas into
their practices. President Barack Obama announced soon after his January 2009
inauguration an Open Government Initiative (OGI)148 whose implementation,
announced in December 2009 by Office of Management and Budget Director Peter
Orszag, sought to promote "[t]he three principles of transparency, participation,
and collaboration [that] form the cornerstone of an open government" through
specific policies that each federal agency would implement.149 Beth Noveck, a
high-profile academic advocate for digital transparency, served a key role in
developing and implementing the OGI. In a blog post she co-authored on the White
House's OGI blog the day after Orszag issued his memo, she promoted open
government as a means to foster "collaboration between government, private
industry, and the public to improve the lives of Americans in their communities,"
and touted the administration's early efforts to make data available to the public
about emergency first responders and nutrition, and to businesses and entrepreneurs
about publicly-funded technologies and patents. 1o In a later interview, Noveck
went so far as to disavow the use of the term "open government" as a moniker for
the Obama administration's program; instead, she explained, it should have been
named as it was conceived-as a collaborative, "wiki"-like recasting of the state's
informational relationship with its citizens. The OGI, in short, would do more
than simply open the government in a traditional manner-it would implement new
governance at the federal level.
148 See Memorandum from President Barack Obama to Heads of Exec. Dep'ts and Agencies, 74 Fed.
Reg. 4685 (Jan. 26, 2009) (proclaiming the President's commitment to making govemment
"transparent," "participatory," and "collaborative" as part of his Administration's effort to be transparent
and open), available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/the_pressoffice/TransparencyandOpen
Government/; WENDY R. GINSBERG, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., THE OBAMA ADMINISTRATION'S OPEN
GOVERNMENT INITIATIVE: ISSUES FOR CONGRESS 12-26 (2011), available at http://
www.law.umaryland.edulmarshall/crsreports/crsdocuments/R41361_01282011.pdf; Paul T. Jaeger &
John Carlo Bertot, Transparency and Technological Change: Ensuring Equal and Sustained Public
Access to Government Information, 27 Gov'T INFO. Q. 371, 373 (2010), available at http://
www.elsevier.com/locate/govinf/. On Noveck's role in the administration, see Daniel Terdiman,
Obama's Open-Government Director Opens Up, CNET NEWS (Dec. 8, 2009, 12:00 PM),
http://news.cnet.com/8301-13772_3-10411479-52.html#ixzzlLsYZuLmt.
'4 Memorandum from Peter R. Orszag, Dir., Office of Mgmt. and Budget, to Heads of Exec. Dep'ts and
Agencies 1 (Dec. 8, 2009), available at bttp://www.whitehouse.gov/omb/assets/memoranda_2010/mlO-
06.pdf.
Iso Norm Eisen & Beth Noveck, Why Open Government Matters, OPEN GOV'T INITIATIVE BLOG
(Dec. 9, 2009, 3:16 PM), http://www.whitehouse.gov/blog/2009/12/09/why-open-govemment-matters.
151 JEFF JARVIS, PUBLIC PARTS 198-99 (2011).
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Digital transparency's promise and application are on even clearer display in
those American municipalities that have aggressively adopted information
technologies to make their data available. 152 A number of larger cities with strong
software development industries have encouraged the use of their data for
development by private firms' 5 3-indeed, the City of New York and its
Metropolitan Transit Authority have even sponsored contests with cash prizes for
software developers to create apps using government data sets.154 New York has
created the position of Chief Digital Officer whose job is to "improv[e]
communication with residents and businesses by enhancing government
transparency and working closely with digital media." 5 5 Such positions, as well as
more senior positions of municipal information or technology officer, have been
given new responsibilities to encourage communication and collaboration with the
public through web portals and social media.' 5 6 In the first months of her tenure as
New York's Chief Digital Officer, Rachel Sterne discussed with technology
companies "ways to use their platforms to showcase the work of city agencies" and
unveiled The Daily Pothole, a blog that reports on street repairs. 1 Filling potholes
is not the only local-government service that information technology can assist.
Drivers in some cities can use applications on their smart phones to learn of
152 The best survey of digital transparency at the municipal level in the U.S. is Shkabatur, supra note
143, at 1443-64.
153 See Claire Cain Miller, Local Governments Offer Data to Software Tinkerers, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 7,
2009, at BI, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2009/12/07/technology/intemet/07cities.html.
154 Sarah Kessler, App Quest Contest Challenges Developers To Create Apps Using NYC Data,
MASHABLE (July 12, 2011), http://mashable.com/2011/07/12/mta-app-contest/.
155 The Mayor's Office ofMedia and Entertainment Announces the Hiring ofRachel Sterne as New York
City's First Chief Digital Officer, NYC.GOV, http://www.nyc.gov/html/media/html/news/cto
announcement.shtml (last visited Nov. 9, 2011); Patrick McGeehan, City Picks Entrepreneur to Lead
Digital Efforts, CITY RooM BLOG (Jan. 24, 2011, 5:24 PM), http://cityroom.blogs.nytimes.com/201 1/
01/24/city-picks-entrepreneur-to-lead-digital-efforts/.
156 See Merrill Douglas, G7: CIOs From Seven Big-Cities Work Together to Develop Open-Source IT
Solutions, GOV'T TECH. (Oct. 18, 2010), http://www.govtech.com/e-govemment/G7-Big-City-CIOs-
Work-to-Develop-Open-Source-IT-Solutions.html. One of the most prominent such CIOs is Chris Vein,
who in 2011 moved from serving as San Francisco's Chief Information Officer to the White House as
Deputy Chief Technology Officer for Innovation. See Adam Conner, Connecting with Chris Vein: City
Hall Technologist, FACEBOOK BLOG (July 19, 2010, 9:31 AM), http://www.facebook.com/blog
.php?post-408323042130; Nick Judd, White House Taps Top City CIO to Replace Beth Noveck as
Deputy CTO for Innovation, TECH PRESIDENT BLOG (Feb. 28, 2011, 11:15 AM), http://
techpresident.com/blog-entry/white-house-taps-top-city-cio-replace-beth-noveck-deputy-cto-innovation.
157 Javier C. Hemadez, A Digital Matchmaker for the City and Its Public, N.Y. TIMES, July 31, 2011, at
MBl.
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available parking spots, for example, while the cities, in turn, can use the data
collected about the demand for parking on certain streets and in certain
neighborhoods to set variable pricing.158 Perhaps unsurprisingly, San Francisco
appears to be in the lead in municipal digital transparency as a matter of practice
and law: not only does it boast DataSF, a web portal that serves as a clearinghouse
for its data sets,'59 but it is also the first city to enact an open-data ordinance
requiring city departments to make their data sets available to the public. 60
Digital-transparency advocates thus promise more than simply a reformed
state. At their most exuberant, they assert that online collaboration and data flows
between public and private parties can shrink the state, if not make it wither away
altogether.16' An "open civic system" carried over and through public and private
networks allows everyone, from app designers to the wisest of crowds, to solve the
problems that bureaucrats formerly struggled with behind the government's closed
doors.162 In the traditional, modem technocratic conception, government agencies
and officials merely gather, organize, and release information. But now, Tim
O'Reilly argues, the state should no longer be viewed as the "first mover of civic
action" but instead as a "platform" and "the manager of a marketplace" for private
and government interaction.' 63 It might continue to provide key public services, but
in doing so it must gather and release data about its performance; it can be involved
1ss See Sarah Kessler, How Smarter Parking Technology Will Reduce Traffic Congestion, MASHABLE
(Apr. 13, 2011), http://mashable.com/2011/04/13/smart-parking-tech/; THE DAILY POTHOLE, http://
thedailypothole.tumblr.com/ (last visited July 21, 2012).
1s9 DataSF-Liberating City Data, DATASF, http://datasf.org/ (last visited July 21, 2012).
160 S.F., CAL., ADMINISTRATIVE CODE § 22D.2 (2011), available at http://www.amlegal.com/nxt/
gateway.dll/Califomia/administrative/administrativecode?f-templates$fn=altmain-nf.htm$3.0 (follow
"Contents" hyperlink on left; then follow "Chapter 22D: Open Source Policy" hyperlink); E.B. Boyd,
San Francisco Passes First Open Data Law, FAST COMPANY (Nov. 9, 2010), http://
www.fastcompany.com/1701410/san-francisco-passes-first-open-data-law.
161 See, e.g., KEvIN KELLY, WHAT TECHNOLOGY WANTS 317 (2010) (arguing that digital "technologies
of collaboration," with their great "powers of socialization-sharing, cooperation, collaboration,
openness, and transparency" enable the triumph of the free market over centralized state planning). This
ideal is not new among Internet futurists and advocates. See FLICHY, supra note 128, at 155-77
(describing the libertarian vision of a limited state among early cyberspace proponents). The conflict
between the collective and individualist strains of digital transparency is akin to the similar conflict in
the romantic ideals of the open source movement. See THOMAS STREETER, THE NET EFFECT 154-67
(2011).
162 John Geraci, The Four Pillars of an Open Civic System, O'REILLY RADAR (June 15, 2009),
http://radar.oreilly.com/2009/06/the-four-pillars-of-an-open-ci.html.
163 O'Reilly, supra note 131, at 12-13.
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in the creation of public goods, but only by building or initiating capital-intensive
infrastructure (like information highways) that are unlikely to be provided in
sufficient quantities by the market.M Then the state must get out of the way,
serving only as a conduit of information by which individual entrepreneurs can
make government data available and useful via the web,165 bloggers and websites
can "crowdsource" government data to make sense out of it,166 and software
designers can "mash-up" government information in order to make it more user-
friendly for mobile computing devices like smart phones. 167 In its collaborative and
shrunken guises, the transformed state will serve as an adjunct to market activity
that exists only to distribute information as a public good and to stimulate private
economic and civic development.168
Significant by its absence in this conception is government's more traditional,
broader police-power authority to enforce laws and promulgate and enforce
regulations, as well as its role in redistributing wealth. The digital state provides
services and information; it eschews coercion and paternalism in favor of
collaboration and negotiation.169 Whereas the traditional FOI approach seeks to
open a window onto state activity, allowing the public to peer in, digital
transparency offers to plug the state into existing data flows, connecting
government, reconceived largely as a data repository, into part of a seamless web
of information.170 The FOI and anti-corruption movements seek to reform the state
and its practices by opening them to public view; digital transparency promises to
transform the state by redefining its role within a networked economy and society.
'"Id. at 12-15.
165 See, e.g., Nancy Scola, Washington's LT Guy, AM. PROSPECT, July/Aug. 2010, at 21, 21-24
(describing the decades-long efforts of Carl Malamud to get government information online).
166 See SIFRY, supra note 127, at 77-82.
167 Ellen S. Miller, Using the Web for Greater Government Openness and Transparency, BUS. OF
GOv'T, Fall/Winter 2009, at 50, 51-52, available at http://www.businessofgovemment.org; Douglas
McGray, iGov: How Geeks are Opening Up Government on the Web, ATLANTIC, Jan.-Feb. 2009, at 36.
168 On the notion of information as a public good, see CAsS SUNSTEIN, REPUBLIC.COM 2.0, at 107-09
(2007).
169 On the relationship between digital technology romanticism and neoliberal ideals about the state's
withering away as an agent of regulation and redistribution, see Thomas Streeter, "That Deep Romantic
Chasm ": Libertarianism, Neoliberalism, and the Computer Culture, in COMMUNICATION, CITIZENSHIP,
AND SOCIAL POLICY 49 (Andrew Calabrese & Jean-Claude Burgelman eds., 1999).
170 See SIFRY, supra note 127, at 102 ("In this understanding, the relationship between governments and
their constituents is a two-way street, and data is the road that connects them.").
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Alongside information technology's promise to transform the state is the
related assumption that technology will transform the public by expanding citizens'
ability to receive data from the state and push data to it. In the digital present,
citizens can finally act as informed users of government services and active
participants in democratic politics. The blogger and journalist Jeff Jarvis imagines a
world in which everyone creates "personal political pages" where they discuss their
own beliefs and commitments, "manage" their "relationship" with politicians and
government officials, and have their pages aggregated by Google ("the polling
place that never closes"). This, in turn, will allow activist networks to form and
participate more effectively in politics and government.' 7' For Yochai Benkler, the
networked information environment has produced "a cultural shift in self-
perception, from passive couch potato to active participant in collaborative
practices for making one's own information universe, [which] opens the
opportunity for a more robust, sustainable level of involvement by citizens in the
governance of their society."l 72 Plugged into the informational network, the state is
now available in unmediated form for contemporary citizens who are no longer
dependent upon the commercial press' institutional gate-keeping role. Private
websites can sort, organize, and make data useful for the public,173 first in the
shadow of and perhaps ultimately in the absence of any authoritative press that
collects information and educates the public. Indeed, a more competitive market of
entrepreneurial data managers, programmers, website authors, and crowdsourcing
masses can mash up and process information that the public finds more useful to its
needs and preferences. Digital transparency promises a future that can develop
participatory, collaborative, and inquisitive "netizens" who are capable of self-rule
out of the bored, passive, and cynical apolitical masses who only imagine they
ruled the opaque state of the twentieth century.
B. The Limits of the Technological Fix
Digital transparency builds on a number of contested assumptions about
information's direct effects.174 Information technology's advocates have long
envisioned a technological sublime: "Every important new technology," Philip
"' Jeff Jarvis, The Ethics of Openness, in REBOOTING AMERICA: IDEAS FOR REDESIGNING AMERICAN
DEMOCRACY FOR THE INTERNET AGE 215, 218-20 (Allison Fine et al. eds., 2008).
172 Yochai Benkler, Participation as Sustainable Cooperation in Pursuit ofPublic Goals, in REBOOTING
AMERICA, supra note 170, at 48, 52-53.
" David Robinson et al., Government Data and the Invisible Hand, 11 YALE J.L. & TECH. 160 (2009).
174 Fenster, supra note 3, at 927-33. For a vivid, articulate description of the conflicts over information
theory, see JAMES GLEICK, THE INFORMATION 413-26 (2011).
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Agre explained, "creates an imaginative vacuum, and time and again this is the sort
of thing that flows into it: tropes of transcendental escape, utopian perfection,
discontinuous change, communitarian intimacy, everlasting peace, and boundless
prosperity."' 7 5  Following this long-established tradition, digital transparency
heralds information technology as the cure to our opaque, bloated state and
disinterested, alienated masses. Notwithstanding the movement's noteworthy
successes at the federal and local levels, however, it is unclear precisely how the
state and public have been or will soon be transformed by the technological and
administrative revolution advocates forecast. Information's fast and cheap
distribution in digital form does not necessarily translate into egalitarianism and
democracy, civic-mindedness and wealth creation, or knowledge and
understanding.'76 No doubt many technologically savvy users of government
services are willing and able to take advantage of new data flows to enhance their
lives and gain knowledge that informs their voting and political participation, but
studies to date have tended to show that use patterns of online government
resources reflect age, class, and educational differences, and that the heaviest users
are the youngest, wealthiest, and most educated.'77 Furthermore, while it is unclear
17s Philip Agre, Cyberspace as American Culture, 11 SCI. AS CULTURE 171, 173-74 (2002); see also
DAVID F. NOBLE, THE RELIGION OF TECHNOLOGY 158-60 (1997) (describing the quasi-religious claims
made by cyberspace proponents). On the history of American preoccupations with technology's utopian
possibilities, see generally DAVID E. NYE, AMERICAN TECHNOLOGICAL SUBLIME (1994) and HOWARD
P. SEGAL, TECHNOLOGICAL UTOPIANISM IN AMERICAN CULTURE (1985). For a critique of this tradition,
with particular emphasis on technology's relationship to exploitative capital, see DAVID F. NOBLE,
AMERICA BY DESIGN: SCIENCE, TECHNOLOGY, AND THE RISE OF CORPORATE CAPITALISM (1977).
176 For examples of critics and skeptics of digital democracy, see MATTHEW HINDMAN, THE MYTH OF
DIGITAL DEMOCRACY 12-19 (2009); EVGENY MOROZOV, NET DELUSION 239-41 (2011); SUNSTEIN,
supra note 168, at 212-23. For examples of sympathetic authors who express skepticism about digital
transparency, see FUNG, GRAHAM & WEIL, supra note 17, at 33-34; MARY GRAHAM, DEMOCRACY BY
DISCLOSURE 140-42 (2002). As David Sholle has noted, advocacy surrounding information technology
frequently views information as a content-less, decontextualized thing, neglecting content and the
complex, context-contingent communicative process in which meaning is produced. See David Sholle,
What Is Information? The Flow ofBits and the Control of Chaos, in DEMOCRACY AND NEW MEDIA 343
(Henry Jenkins & David Thorburn eds., 2003). As Roland Barthes explained, the notion that language is
merely instrumental, neutral, and above all transparent is itself a product of the emergence of modem
science, religious argument, and empiricist and rationalist ideals. See ROLAND BARTHES, THE RUSTLE
OF LANGUAGE 4 (Richard Howard trans., 1986).
177 See AARON SMITH, PEW INTERNET & AM. LIFE PROJECT REPORT, GOVERNMENT ONLINE: THE
INTERNET GIVES CITIZENS NEW PATHS TO GOVERNMENT SERVICES AND INFORMATION (2010),
available at http://www.pewinternet.org/-/media//Files/Reports/2010/PIP_GovernmentOnline2010
with topline.pdf; Michael X. Delli Carpini & Scott Keeter, The Internet and an Informed Citizenry, in
THE CIVIC WEB 129, 139-45 (David M. Anderson & Michael Cornfield eds., 2003); Samuel J. Best &
Brian S. Krueger, Analyzing the Representativeness of Internet Political Participation, 27 POL. BEHAV.
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whether the public is incrementally more informed about government and its
performance than in the pre-digital era, dissatisfaction with the state appears to run
at least as high as in analog times. The wired general public has not (yet, at least)
been transformed into the satisfied, enlightened, collaborative polis that digital
transparency promises.
Nor is it clear that information technology can tame the institutional
complexity and bureaucratic resistance that complicate efforts to reveal the state to
the public. The modem state, for good and bad reasons, is composed of multiple,
overlapping organizational layers that extend within and across jurisdictions and
space;1 78 smoothing out its striated institutions will require more than imagining it
as a data repository and single entity capable of open collaboration and then
offering a technological fix through access to government data and open source
code.179 Again, there is no doubt that governments, NGOs, and commercial entities
have made great inroads into making government information available and useful,
but one would be hard-pressed at present to conclude that these effects have created
a new form of government or new age of governance. The Obama administration's
efforts illustrate this well: the very digital advocates who cheered the
announcement of its OGI have complained that its changes have been incremental
rather than revolutionary and that its implementation has frequently been
disappointing.'so Perhaps the disappointing results have come from a failure of
administrative will or strategy, or demonstrate the entrenchment of existing
practices, or the necessary resources were not available, or digital transparency
183, 185-86 (2005); Kay Lehman Schlozman, Sidney Verba & Henry E. Brady, Weapon of the Strong?
Participatory Inequality and the Internet, 8 PERSP. ON POL. 487 (2010).
178 On how the state's organizational and geographical complexity makes transparency difficult to
accomplish, see Fenster, Seeing the State, supra note 3, at 632-36.
179 For an illustration of how the bureaucratic empire fights back, see What Transparency Means to
Feds, NEXTGOv (Apr. 1, 2009), http://www.nextgov.com/nextgov/ng_20090401 5914.php (polling
government managers and finding a mixed response to the Obama administration's Open Government
Initiative).
Iso Jaeger & Bertot, supra note 148, at 373-75; Open Government Directive: Year One, Success and
Setbacks on the Way to a More Open Government, SUNLIGHT FOUND. (Dec. 7, 2010), http://
sunlightfoundation.com/press/releases/2010/12/07/open-government-directive-year-one/ ("The [Obama]
administration has to give stronger direction and urge the agencies to move forward if the promise of an
open government is to be realized."). More traditional transparency advocates, such as the National
Security Archive, have expressed similar disappointment in the administration's more traditional
disclosure practices under the FOLA. See NAT'L SEC. ARCHIVE, GLASS HALF FULL: 2011 KNIGHT OPEN
GOVERNMENT SURVEY FINDS FREEDOM OF INFORMATION CHANGE (2011), available at http://
www.gwu.edu/-nsarchiv/NSAEBB/NSAEBB338/KnightOpenGovtSurvey2011.pdf (reporting on the
mixed results of an audit of federal agencies' compliance with FOIA).
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became a lower priority as the administration faced more difficult and important
challenges; perhaps it was never intended to be an especially high priority. For
whatever reason, digital transparency has not proven its inevitable triumph over the
federal bureaucracy, even within an administration and program that appeared so
promising. At the same time, the Obama administration's achievements are
fragile-in the present the OGI relies on the current administration's willingness to
invest human and capital resources on its development, and it may be abandoned or
reduced by future presidents.' 8' Put simply, the digital-transparency revolution,
should it occur, will be a consequence of both policy and politics. It will continue
to be subject to these very human, imperfect processes, rather than bloom
inexorably through some ahistorical, sublime technological force.
C. Conclusion
Digital-transparency advocates claim that the revolution in information
technology has already freed and will only further free the state's data to the public,
for whom it will be packaged by public entities, private entrepreneurs, and wise,
wired crowds so that it can be available for everyday use, political action, and
commercial advantage. The basic logic underlying this process parallels those
described in the rights-based FOI movement and the contemporary digital
movement: the state is a repository of information (recast now as data) that must be
freed from its clutches and made available to the public, although by means of code
and bits rather than law; and once information (or data) is made "free" (or flows
through a network), it will necessarily have transformative, positive effects on
politics and society.' 82 In this regard, they both share civic ideals that date back at
least to the Progressive Era, when to be a good citizen required one to be well
informed. 8 3 The happy ending that digital transparency's policy story offers also
parallels Transparency International's prescription: that the transparent
administrative state will operate more efficiently and inspire the development of
new markets for investment and widespread economic development.
Nevertheless, digital transparency relies on a quite different set of tools to
secure a transparent state. Information technology, and developers that innovatively
apply it, will better fix the state than legal rights enforced by state institutions and
1'1 A Congressional Research Service report on the OGI provides a mixed review of the administration's
performance and identifies, without any recommendation, the issue of whether Congress should codify
any of the OGI's policies. See GINSBERG, supra note 148, at 27-28.
182 Fenster, supra note 3, at 895-902.
83 Michael Schudson, Click Here for Democracy: A History and Critique of an Information-Based
Model ofCitizenship, in DEMOCRACY AND NEW MEDIA, supra note 176, at 49, 57.
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the press or the transnational institutional watchdogs that pressure state institutions
to conform to administrative and legal norms. More significantly, the classic legal
approach views the rights and duties that open government laws create as acting
neutrally upon the state, whose functions and operations would not necessarily
change-though they would improve-due to the greater exposure and
accountability that an enforceable right to know allows. The digital-transparency
movement, by contrast, imagines a state that is defined by its data and the flow of
information to and from it rather than by its actions, that is more immediately
responsive to the public and allows extensive citizen participation and
collaboration, and that provides a "platform" for government services and for the
provision of public informational goods. The staunchest of the digital advocates
appear ready to abandon the standard post-war model of the regulatory welfare
state, with its overly paternalistic and invasive bureaucracy, and replace it with one
that does little more than collect and enable the aggregation of data for public use
and benefit or that operates as an open-source government through which citizens
act directly with and upon officials to rule themselves. And whereas the FOI and
NGO-based approaches envision a public that pays attention to the state and holds
it accountable, digital-transparency advocates envision a thoroughly active public
that is fully capable of engaging in effective popular democracy. Having subverted
the intermediaries of the institutional press, having rendered an independent
judiciary and transnational NGOs (themselves now networked with state actors and
IFIs) largely unnecessary, and having shrunk the state and left it smaller and with a
humbler role, digital transparency assumes in their place the emergence of a public
that will act as wired "netizens" (and decidedly not mere couch potatoes).
IV. THE VIGILANTE FIx: WIKILEAKS AND TRANSPARENCY
Along with its offshoots and followers, 84 WikiLeaks offers a distinct
transparency agent: an organization and media outlet with the means to receive
important digital files that shed light on government actions, distribute the files
widely in electronic form, and protect its sources' anonymity.'8s After launching in
184 See infra note 193.
.ss The full WikiLeaks story is complex and still developing as this article is being written. For thorough
and more fully sourced accounts, on which this section will depend, see Benkler, supra note 16; Mark
Fenster, Disclosure's Effects: WikiLeaks and Transparency, 97 IOWA L. REv. 753 (2012), available at
http://www.uiowa.edu/-ilr/issues/ILR_97-3_Fenster.pdf. For additional background information, see
generally DAVID LEIGH & LUKE HARDING, WIKILEAKS: INSIDE JULIAN ASSANGE'S WAR ON SECRECY
(2011); GREG MITCHELL, THE AGE OF WIKILEAKS (2011); Alasdair Roberts, WikiLeaks: The Illusion of
Transparency, 78 INT'L REV. ADMIN. SCI. 116 (2012); Molly Sauter, WikiLeaks FAQ, THE FUTURE OF
THE INTERNET AND How TO STOP IT BLOG (Dec. 7, 2010), http://futureoftheinternet.org/wikileaks-
cable-faq; WikiLeaks, WIKIPEDIA, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/WikiLeaks (last updated July 2011). In
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2006 and enjoying some success in releasing documents that proved embarrassing
to some governments,'86 the site became most famous in the U.S. in 2010 when it
began to release a massive cache of classified files that had been stolen from the
Departments of Defense and State,'87 allegedly by a serviceman whose security
clearance and computer skills enabled him to download the materials from a
military file server.'88 Although none was classified above "secret,"' 89 the
documents were unavailable to the public prior to their release by WikiLeaks.190
Commentators have debated the extent of the documents' significance and how
much they have revealed, but there can be no question that WikiLeaks's disclosures
addition to government documents, WikiLeaks also receives and distributes documents purloined from
private corporations, but I will focus here only on the government documents it has released.
186 WikiLeaks's early releases of documents included evidence of corruption in the Kenyan government;
operation manuals of the Guantanamo Bay detention camp; secret manuals from the Church of
Scientology; and documents that revealed self-dealing by the owners of Kaupthing Bank, the bank
whose collapse hastened Iceland's financial downfall. See LEIGH & HARDING, supra note 185, at 57-64;
Manfred Goetzke, WikiLeaks Website Offers Promising Outlet for Fighting Corruption, DEUTSCHE
WELLE (Nov. 26, 2009), http://www.dw-world.de/dw/article/0,,4930880,00.html.
' Benkler, supra note 16, at 321-30.
188 MITCHELL, supra note 185, at 38-50; Alex Altman, Afghan Leaks: Is the U.S. Keeping Too Many
Secrets?, TIME, July 30, 2010, http://www.time.com/time/nation/article/0,8599,2007224,00.html;
Ginger Thompson, Early Struggles ofSoldier Charged in Leak Case, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 9,2010, at Al.
89 Most of the documents that composed the Afghanistan and Iraq "War Logs" were classified "secret."
Piecing Together the Reports, and Deciding What to Publish, N.Y. TIMES, July 26, 2010, at A8,
available at http://www.nytimes.com/2010/07/26/world/26editors-note.html; Scott Stewart, WikiLeaks
and the Culture of Classification, STRATFOR GLOBAL INTEL. (Oct. 28, 2010),
http://www.stratfor.comi/weekly/20101027wikileaksandculture-classification. Of the more than
250,000 diplomatic cables WikiLeaks obtained, approximately 11,000 were classified "secret," 4000
were classified "secret" and "noforn" (that is, not to be shared with a foreign government), and 9000
were classified "noforn." Scott Shane & Andrew Lehren, Leaked Cables Offer Raw Look at U.S.
Diplomacy, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 29, 2010, at Al, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2010/l1/29/
world/29cables.html. See also What Do the Diplomatic Cables Really Tell Us?, DER SPIEGEL (Nov. 28,
2010), http://www.spiegel.de/intemationa/world/0,1518,731441,00.html (giving slightly different
figures from those reported by The New York Times).
19n See Daniel W. Drezner, Why WikiLeaks Is Bad for Scholars, CHRON. HIGHER ED., Dec. 5, 2010,
http://chronicle.com/article/Why-WikiLeaks-Is-Bad-for/125628/ (characterizing diplomatic cables as
documents that would have been unavailable to academics for decades); Dan Murphy, WikiLeaks
Releases Video Depicting U.S. Forces Killing of Two Reuters Journalists in Iraq, CHRISTIAN SC.
MONITOR (Apr. 5, 2010), http://www.csmonitor.com/World/Global-News/2010/0405/Wikileaks-
releases-video-depicting-US-forces-killing-of-two-Reuters-joumalists-in-raq (noting that the Collateral
Murder video showed an attack about which Reuters had unsuccessfully sought information through the
Freedom of Information Act).
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have at least marginally increased public knowledge about recent American
military campaigns and the nation's diplomatic relations with other countries. 19 1
The organization itself is small and somewhat anonymous (besides the
celebrity status of its founder, Julian Assange), but it presents itself as a
transnational NGO campaigning to change the political order and society. As its
website declares,
WikiLeaks is an independent global group of people with a long standing
dedication to the idea of a free press and the improved transparency in society
that comes from this....
The broader principles on which our work is based are the defence of freedom of
speech and media publishing, the improvement of our common historical record
and the support of the rights of all people to create new history. We derive these
principles from the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. 192
Embracing the conception of government information as a human right while
exploiting information technology both to obtain and distribute classified
documents, WikiLeaks combines elements of both the rights-based and digital-
transparency advocacy movements.
A. Vigilante Transparency as Rights Protector and Enforcer
WikiLeaks has played two significant roles as an advocate for transparency.
First, by establishing its own powerful brand identity as a technologically
sophisticated service capable of distributing purloined data anonymously, it has
proven the viability of an anonymous, online leaking site as a model for others to
follow. Numerous sites, both independent, non-profit ones and some proposed by
established newspapers, have announced plans to do so.1 93 Second, its extralegal
19' See Fenster, supra note 185, at 790-807 (summarizing arguments made by WikiLeaks critics and
proponents on the relative significance of the site's disclosures, and attempting to discern their wider
impact on the general public).
192 About: What Is WikiLeaks?, WIKILEAKS, http://wikileaks.org/About.html (last visited July 21, 2012).
' A disgruntled former WikiLeaks member, Daniel Domscheit-Berg, has launched another rival site,
while The New York Times, WikiLeaks's U.S. journalistic collaborator (with which it has a stormy
relationship), may establish a competing site that would allow whistleblowers to anonymously pass
documents to the newspaper. See Michael Calderone, NY Times Considers Creating an "EZ Pass Lane
for Leakers," YAHOO! NEWS BLOG (Jan. 25, 2010, 8:38 AM), http://news.yahoo.comi/blogs/cutline/ny-
times-considers-creating-ez-pass-lane-leakers-20110125-053811-988.html; A Swarm of Leaks,
ECONOMIST, Dec.9, 2010, at 72, available at http://www.economist.com/node/17674089?story-id=
17674089; Frank Jordans, Openleaks, WikiLeaks Rival, Launches New Secret-Spilling Site,
HUFFINGTON POST (Jan. 28, 2011, 10:31 AM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2011/01/28/openleaks-
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(and possibly illegal) disclosure of illegally obtained government documents
implicitly challenges government information security policies, a challenge that
Assange has made explicit in his writings and interviews.194 Like digital and anti-
corruption transparency advocates, Assange has identified an information
asymmetry and hoarding problem, a transparency fix, and a political objective:
state secrecy can be defeated by whistleblowers and hackers who, through the
medium of WikiLeaks, will leave in their wake a smaller, chastened, fully visible
state.
The issue WikiLeaks has confronted is the same that motivated the original
FOI movement: state actors' under-enforcement or blatant disregard of the public's
basic human right to view government information.'95 The site describes its project
in broad, world-historical terms:
Article 19 [of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights] inspires the work of
our journalists and other volunteers. It states that everyone has the right to
freedom of opinion and expression; this right includes freedom to hold opinions
without interference and to seek, receive and impart information and ideas
through any media and regardless of frontiers. We agree, and we seek to uphold
this and the other Articles of the Declaration.'9 6
WikiLeaks enforces this right, it claims, by disclosing facts-the raw documents
that the state attempts to suppress. It does so through the "scientific journalism" it
wikileaks-rival_0_n_815309.html. For accounts of other sites that have either adopted or adapted the
WikiLeaks model, or that have announced plans to do so, see Benkler supra note 16, at 350; Fenster,
supra note 184, at 759-60.
194 See, e.g., About: What Is WikiLeaks?, supra note 192 (defining and defending "principled leaking" as
a means to resist and challenge "secrecy laws [that] are being used to keep the public ignorant of gross
dishonesty practised by their own government"); Bivol, 2011-05-01 Julian Assange: "I Believe in the
Right to Communicate and the Inviolability of History," WL CENTRAL (May 1, 2011), http://
wlcentral.org/node/1727 (quoting Assange interview with Bulgarian investigative journalism website in
which he states, "Cablegate was not born from the citizen's rights to access information: if this was the
case Cablegate would have come from FOIA requests. Rather it was born from people who presumably
worked for the US government feeling the information they saw showed wrongdoing that the public
should know about.").
195 Hans Ulrich Obrist, In Conversation with Julian Assange, Part II, 26 E-FLUX J., June 2011, at 7,
available at http://worker0l.e-flux.com/pdflarticle_238.pdf [hereinafter Obrist, Conversation Il]
(claiming that WikiLeaks can enforce the human right to know, the right to speak, and, above all, the
right to communicate information).
'
9 6 About: What Is WikiLeaks?, supra note 192.
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claims to practice, which proves the truth of an objective news story by allowing
readers "to click online to see the original document it is based on. That way you
can judge for yourself: Is the story true? Did the journalist report it accurately?"l97
Although it shares with the legal-rights approach the claim that access to
government information is so central to democracy that it must receive legal
protection, the site has little faith in the state's willingness to disclose its secrets
and even to obey its own laws. Instead, WikiLeaks claims to advance popular
democracy against despotic central authorities by obtaining and distributing the
sovereign's information:
Today, with authoritarian governments in power in much of the world,
increasing authoritarian tendencies in democratic governments, and increasing
amounts of power vested in unaccountable corporations, the need for openness
and transparency is greater than ever. WikiLeaks interest is the revelation of the
truth [sic]. Unlike the covert activities of state intelligence agencies, as a media
publisher WikiLeaks relies upon the power of overt fact to enable and empower
citizens to bring feared and corrupt governments and corporations to justice.'98
The press interest groups and activists in the post-war period criticized state
secrecy because they feared its use as a means to hide corrupt and potentially
abusive government. They assumed that the state could serve as the institutional
basis for reform. Working more than fifty years after the FOI movement began,
WikiLeaks rejects political and legal reform in favor of active opposition to the
state.
For WikiLeaks, technology, unlike law, can trump the power and privilege of
authoritarian governments and the authoritarian "tendencies" of putatively
democratic states. "As a result of technical advances," WikiLeaks declares,
"particularly the internet and cryptography," it can receive and distribute state
secrets while it lowers if not eliminates risk to itself, its readers, and, most
importantly, its sources.' 99 This looks superficially like a technological fix to
secrecy akin to that proposed by the digital-transparency movement, and the site
appears to share technologists' utopian sentiments about a networked future.
'9 Julian Assange, Don't Shoot Messenger for Revealing Uncomfortable Truths, AUSTRALIAN, Dec. 8,
2010, http://www.theaustralian.com.au/in-depth/wikileaks/dont-shoot-messenger-for-revealing-
uncomfortable-truths/story-fn775xjq-1225967241332.
19 About: What Is WikiLeaks?, supra note 192.
19 Id.
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WikiLeaks does not share the technologists' sunny view of social media and
collaboration, however, and Assange himself appears as distrustful of the market
and of corporate entities as he is of the state.200 He has explicitly expressed disdain
for the very collaborative technological mechanisms that the digital-transparency
advocates embrace-blogs, crowdsourcing, and the like-in the distribution of
information. 201 The site had at first depended on the blogosphere and online
communities to publicize its releases and provide further investigation into their
significance and context-a hope that proved unavailing.202 As a result, the site
began to collaborate directly with major international newspapers for its
Afghanistan, State Department, and Guantanamo releases, embracing precisely the
old media whose predecessors sponsored the first wave of transparency advocacy
and whose rapidly diminishing status as information gatekeeper the digital world
was supposed to render obsolete. 203
In combining but also rejecting elements of the rights-based and digital
approaches to transparency, while collaborating with mainstream newspapers and
declaring its radical distrust of the state and other concentrated sources of power,
WikiLeaks articulates and advocates a complex, conflicting conception of
transparency. On the one hand, it seems to pursue the traditional goal of revealing
the state to the public-not only to the citizens who can hold the state directly
accountable but also to everyone who is able to "see evidence of the truth." 204
"[O]ur sort of modus operandi behind our whole organization," Assange has said,
"is to get out suppressed information into the public, where the press and the public
200 Fenster, supra note 185, at 780.
201 See Julian Assange, The Hidden Curse of Thomas Paine, GUERNICA, Apr. 29, 2008, http://
www.guernicamag.com/blog/571/the-hidden curse of thomas_pai/; Aaron Bady, Julian Assange in
Berkeley, ZUNGUZUNGU (Dec. 12, 2010, 5:53 PM), http://zunguzungu.wordpress.com/2010/12/12/
julian-assange-in-berkeley/ (quoting Assange's comments in an academic forum in which he complained
that bloggers and the like "don't give a fuck about the material" and write in order to speak to and gain
status with peers, not because of their inherent interest in the material or willingness to investigate it
further).
202 See WikiLeaks: Big Picture, WIKILEAKs, http://wikileaks.org/wikilWikiLeaks:Bigpicture (last
visited July 22, 2012).
203 See generally LEIGH & HARDING, supra note 185, at 110-15 (describing the negotiated agreements
between WikiLeaks and its newspaper partners to redact documents); Benkler, supra note 16, at 323-24
(summarizing the WikiLeaks releases and describing the site's relationship with the established print
news media).
204 About: What Is WikiLeaks?, supra note 192.
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and our nation's politics can work on it to produce better outcomes." 205 All of the
movements discussed above share this general assumption and ideal: more
information leads to a more visible, functional, and authentically democratic state.
And like the others, WikiLeaks can claim at least some success. Its recent military
and diplomatic disclosures from the U.S. might only have marginally affected
American politics and government policy, 206 but the documents it has released have
been distributed globally and seem to have affected countries discussed in the State
Department cables.207 Viewed this way, WikiLeaks appears to offer an institutional
mechanism for democratic reform, like the earlier transparency advocacy
movements.
But WikiLeaks also aspires to transform the state in more radical ways. Its
critique of the state's tendency towards secrecy, as well as Assange's formative
years in the "cypherpunk" community and his pre-2010 writings, bespeak a
political program that views disclosure primarily as a means to discipline and limit
the modem state's authority over its subjects and its dealings with other nations.208
One of Assange's essays, posted online in the period just prior to WikiLeaks'
launch, sets forth his justification for and theory of deploying transparency as an
almost revolutionary weapon against what he described as the pervasively
autocratic, secretive nature of contemporary states.209 When faced with the threat
205 Julian Assange on WikiLeaks, War and Resisting Government Crackdown, DEMOCRACY Now!
(Dec. 31, 2010), http://www.democracynow.org/2010/12/31/julian-assangeon wikileaks-war-and; see
also Time's Julian Assange Interview: Full Transcript/Audio, TiME (Dec. 1, 2010), http://
www.time.com/time/world/article/0,8599,2034040,00.html (claiming that transparency can "achieve a
more just society" by allowing a more knowledgeable, engaged public to oppose "abusive plans or
behavior").
206 See Roberts, supra note 185, at 125-28 (noting that WikiLeaks has had minimal effects in the U.S.).
207 See generally Fenster, supra note 185 (summarizing claims about external effects of WikiLeaks's
State Department releases on revolutions in North Africa).
208 The best resource for information about Assange's early career as a hacker and "cypherpunk," and
the development of WikiLeaks is Robert Manne, The Cypherpunk Revolutionary, MONTHLY, Mar.
2011, http://www.themonthly.com.au/julian-assange-cypherpunk-revolutionary-robert-manne-308 1?
page= %2C3 &destination=.
209 JULIAN ASSANGE, CONSPIRACY As GOVERNANCE (2006), available at http://cryptome.org/0002/ja-
conspiracies.pdf. For fuller descriptions of the radical strain in Assange's writings, see Aaron Bady,
Julian Assange and the Computer Conspiracy; "To Destroy This Invisible Government," ZUNGUZUNGU
(Nov. 29, 2010, 9:05 AM), http://zunguzungu.wordpress.com/2010/11/29/julian-assange-and-the-
computer-conspiracy-"to-destroy-this-invisible-govemment"/; Fenster, supra note 185, at 774-82; Peter
Ludlow, Rethinking Conspiracy: The Political Philosophy of Julian Assange, available at Brian Leiter,
Peter Ludlow on "The Political Philosophy of Julian Assange," LEITER REP.: A PHIL. BLOG (Dec. 7,
2010, 4:16PM), http://leiterreports.typepad.com/blog/2010/12/peter-ludlow-on-the-political-
philosophy-of-julian-assange.htnl.
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that all of its internal correspondence will be leaked, a powerful, secretive regime
will find itself unable to communicate with the agents it needs to oversee and
instruct in order to operate. It must therefore either reform itself and act ethically-
in which case transparency has in fact performed its reformist function-or
collapse. Transparency, then, serves not merely to improve the state but to pose a
fundamental challenge to its operations.210 No such challenge can come from
within the state itself Laws attempting to impose transparency, which by definition
are drafted and enforced by government institutions, will not offer the complete
exposure that the right of access to information requires. Only a wholly
independent institution, one willing to deploy extralegal tactics at the leading edge
of technological innovation, can do so. Rather than viewing information technology
as a means to reform the state's administrative functions, WikiLeaks views its
technological capabilities as a means to spur a collective political uprising that can
refigure the state through popular democracy.
B. The Limits of the Vigilante Fix
Criticism of WikiLeaks as a model for transparency activism and as a
proponent of a particular vision of transparency enforcement begins, typically, with
the argument that it either engages in or solicits criminal activity. 21 There is no
question that it must rely on unauthorized and possibly illegal disclosures made by
its sources. But with respect to WikiLeaks itself, the unauthorized, potentially
criminal nature of these disclosures provokes one critique, one prediction, and one
problem for the organization and those who follow its model: First, WikiLeaks'
actions constitute or rely upon lawless actions.212 Second, its disclosures will cause
harm to American military, law enforcement, and diplomatic efforts.213 And third,
its reliance on unauthorized, potentially illegal disclosures makes WikiLeaks
vulnerable to supply chokeholds. I want to set aside the first issue to the extent that
210 ASSANGE, supra note 209, at 1 (calling for a "course of ennobling and effective action to replace the
structures that lead to bad governance with something better").
211 See Benkler, supra note 16, at 331-33 (summarizing official complaints about WikiLeaks as lawless
and as assisting terrorists); Fenster, supra note 185, at 770-72 (summarizing FOI advocates' complaints
about WikiLeaks).
212 See, e.g., Steven Aftergood, WikiLeaks Fails "Due Diligence" Review, SECRECY NEWS (June 28,
2010, 11:19 AM), http://www.fas.org/blog/secrecy/2010/06/wikileaks_review.html (leading
transparency advocate declaring that "WikiLeaks must be counted among the enemies of open society
because it does not respect the rule of law nor does it honor the rights of individuals"). For a thorough
discussion of WikiLeaks's potential criminal liability, see Benkler, supra note 16, at 356-65.
213 See Benkler, supra note 16, at 331-33 (summarizing claims made by elected and Executive Branch
officials about the dangers of WikiLeaks's disclosures), 328-30 (dismissing such concerns).
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it conjures up the complex legal issue of WikiLeaks' criminal liability (which is
beyond this article's scope),214 and the adverse effects of its disclosures, which are
to date arguably minimal and which the site itself claims to mitigate through its
"harm minimization" efforts. 215 Instead, I will focus on the problem that WikiLeaks
faces in obtaining a sufficient supply of secrets, the site's most significant
vulnerability as a model to systematically force transparency upon states.
WikiLeaks necessarily relies upon the existence of whistleblowers and
hackers who are willing to release information against the state's wishes and in
violation of the law, a reliance that is neither particularly new nor a systematic
means to make the state open. It thus confronts a problem that Daniel Ellsberg, as a
Pentagon employee with security clearance and direct access to the documents he
released, and with the single motivation of ending the Vietnam War, did not face
after he leaked the Pentagon Papers-but would have faced had he promised to
continue making unauthorized disclosures of classified documents from the
American military as part of a broader effort to open all secret American
government operations to public view. WikiLeaks's business model, by contrast,
depends upon the ongoing availability of content, while its political program as an
agent of transparency depends upon the credible threat of an endless supply of
leaked documents. Unlike the FOI, anti-corruption, and digital-transparency
movements, all of which seek to petition and persuade the state to change its
policies and practices, WikiLeaks operates in direct opposition to the state, whose
laws it at best skirts and more often openly violates in order to enforce broader
international human rights. Even the minimally non-transparent state cannot accede
to WikiLeaks' demands; it will inevitably attempt to control its information and
stop leaks.216 If it successfully does so, then WikiLeaks and similar channels will
lack supply from frustrated government employees or those who steal documents,
and the model will fail while the state will remain opaque to its citizens.
As a result, even if it can solve its ongoing financial and legal problems, and
even if its model is successfully adopted by well-funded institutions, WikiLeaks
" See id at 356-65 (discussing WikiLeaks's potential legal liability).
215 See Fenster, supra note 185, at 789-97.
216 Notwithstanding its apparent commitment to open government, see text accompanying supra notes
148-150, the Obama administration has been especially aggressive in prosecuting leaks. See Josh
Gerstein, Despite Openness Pledge, President Obama Pursues Leakers, POLITICO (Mar. 7, 2011),
http://www.politico.com/news/stories/0311/50761.html; Carrie Johnson, Case Against WikiLeaks Part
of Broader Campaign, NPR (May 11, 2011), http://www.npr.org/2011/05/11/136173262/case-against-
wikileaks-part-of-broader-campaign; Jane Mayer, The Secret Sharer, NEW YORKER, May 23, 2011,
http://www.newyorker.com/reporting/2011/05/23/110523fa-fact-mayer.
UNIVERSITY OF PITTSBURGH LAw REVIEW
PAGE 1500 VOLUME 73 (2012)
and its successors and copycats will always face a supply problem, one made more
difficult when governments better secure their computer networks and security
systems and harshly punish whistleblowers.217 It is possible, of course, that a
thousand WikiLeaks will bloom, perhaps as small start-ups in response to new
caches of documents, or that established newspapers or well-funded NGOs will be
able to copy the WikiLeaks model and use it more regularly. But this scenario
suggests something less than a permanent program to force transparency, especially
in contrast to those advocated through law, technology, or international NGOs and
IFIs, which propose permanent fixes to information asymmetry. Instead, it
represents an irregular set of practices that can only be effective when sources
make documents available. The risk that WikiLeaks and others will obtain and
distribute documents over the Internet might affect official behavior, but it is
unclear if those effects will either favor openness-for example, when state actors
preemptively release documents or hold open meetings-or secrecy-for example,
when officials do a more effective job of hiding their communication. The state
will ultimately remain opaque except when WikiLeaks can crack it open-a
dramatic but comparatively underwhelming ideal for making the state permanently
and programmatically visible.
C. Conclusion
WikiLeaks rests its vision of a more functional and democratic state on the
assumption that more disclosures will positively affect the state and public. Like
FOI advocates, it views transparency as a human and political right; like anti-
corruption advocates, it views the state as inevitably corrupt without the monitoring
that NGOs and other external institutions can provide; and like digital-transparency
advocates, it views new technological developments as enabling a more visible,
accountable state. But the site's commitment to vigilante disclosures of government
documents, as well as its radical political project and skepticism about the online
community's ability to process and distribute the information that it liberates,
distinguish both its project and its vision of a truly transparent state. The state it
hopes to call forth is neither the traditional one (as the FOI movement relies upon),
nor the one overseen by networks of international NGOs that are in turn tied to
networks of global capital (like the anti-corruption movement), nor a collaborative
or minimal, market-oriented one (that digital advocates prefer), but a left-libertarian
state that fully meets its international human rights obligations-obligations that
217 See Fenster, supra note 185, at 764-65 (discussing the U.S. government's aggressive, if thus far
unsuccessful, efforts to punish WikiLeaks, and the military's harsh incarceration of Bradley Manning as
a strategy to dissuade others from leaking documents).
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WikiLeaks will enforce, if no one else will-or will suffer the legal or
revolutionary consequences.
WikiLeaks's most significant leaks to date have brought the site and its
founder significant celebrity and may have played some supporting role in the
political upheaval in Tunisia (which, in turn, may have had ripple effects in North
Africa and the Middle East during the so-called Arab Spring). But the excessive
legal and financial hurdles it has faced-surely predictable, given its open
animosity to state institutions and laws-have hampered its operations and raised
the anticipated costs of any who would follow in the site's footsteps. And
ultimately, WikiLeaks seems not to have had the kinds of effects that would
support its boldest claims about its potential as an agent of transparency or about
transparency's potentially radical effects. As with digital-transparency advocates,
WikiLeaks's faith in its technological fix is belied by a post-technological political
order that looks quite a bit like the one that preceded it.
CONCLUSION: TRANSPARENCY IN SEARCH OF A Fix
Since advocacy on transparency's behalf began in earnest during the mid-
twentieth century, its various movements have proceeded from the same basic
assumption about the problem that their efforts hope to solve-that states and state
actors seek to protect the information they collect and produce from public
disclosure. These movements also share a commitment to the idea that an external
authority, whether legal, technological, or institutional, can provide the necessary
fix. And as I have argued here, each movement is certain that its solution will, in
turn, transform the state in a manner consistent with the movement's political
commitments and institutional interests.
Nevertheless, they differ in the details of the fix they propose and the state
they imagine. The FOI movement has long advocated new administrative laws and
enhanced judicial review of administrative agencies, with the newly disclosed
information reported on by an authoritative press-an institutional arrangement
that was consistent with the existing state apparatus in the post-war U.S. The anti-
corruption movement advocates a transnational effort, led by NGOs and IFIs, to
impose administrative and legal reforms that will lead to a non-corrupt state and a
functional economy--one that is open to the flow of global investment. The digital-
transparency movement advocates the expanded use of information technologies to
bring about a collaborative, open, smaller, and wired state, watched over by
websites, netizens, and the wired public at large. WikiLeaks envisions unauthorized
leaks as a means to protect and enforce human informational rights in a
constrained, secretive state.
The movements differ, too, in their relationships with the existing, flawed
state they hope to change or even dismantle. Press advocates for a legal-rights
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approach lobbied and collaborated with state actors, but in an effort to constrain the
state in a process that included investigations and critiques of the government
bureaucracy. Anti-corruption advocates collaborate with more powerful IFIs and
with sympathetic state actors, but in an effort to fight what they view as state
officials' inevitable tendency towards corruption. Digital-transparency advocates
collaborate with tech-savvy state actors regarding technical standards and data
releases while critiquing state bureaucracy and, especially, its tendencies to hoard
information and to refuse to collaborate and communicate with the public. And
WikiLeaks views the state as an adversary whose foundations can and must be
shaken by surreptitious and perhaps criminal efforts to steal its data.
The newer transparency advocacy movements thus express, in different ways,
dissatisfaction with the contemporary administrative state and with the laws
intended to impose order and control over it. They envision a bounded, tamed state
whose relationship to the public (and, for anti-corruption and digital-transparency
advocates, the market) makes it more functional. The resulting state they envision
may be smaller-indeed, perhaps it will no longer exist in its present form-but it
will certainly operate more efficiently, more effectively, and, most importantly, in a
more publicly accountable, more truly democratic manner. They thus work within
and extend prevailing political, economic, and ideological shifts away from the
post-war administrative state and towards one or more other ends: the globalization
of capital, political sovereignty, and culture; the diffusion of digital technologies
and networks; and a smaller, more modest role for the state in private markets and
activities. Like the earlier FOI movement, they are political actors, deploying
transparency to meet normative, prescriptive goals. There is, of course, nothing
wrong with the political nature of transparency advocacy; advocates must persuade
the public and petition government officials. But as I have tried to illustrate in this
article, transparency is not a single or neutral administrative norm, despite efforts to
advance it as such. Not only are its definition and limits contested, but advocates
disagree over the best means to achieve it. Embedded within those disagreements
are contested political ideas about the state. Not only does transparency require
political advocacy, but it is, itself, a deeply political norm.
Advocacy for transparency fixes has not to date resulted in the happy ending
that advocates forecast. Notwithstanding the enactment of laws and recognition of
public rights to require disclosure, parts of the state remain hidden; notwithstanding
the best efforts of a wide array of NGOs to unveil and stop the state's tendency
towards corruption, the dream of a pure, honest government has been frustrated by
the political nature of the state's operations, the financial implications of official
decision-making, and local bureaucratic resistance; notwithstanding information
technology's ability to move data from the state to public, government operations
remain at a remove, while large swathes of the public appear unmoved by the
digital magic; and notwithstanding the spectacular liberation of hundreds of
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thousands of its secret documents, the American superpower has neither been
overthrown by popular revolution nor faces internal collapse. The opacity that
remains despite advocates' best efforts-an opacity that indeed inhibits democracy
and good governance-only demonstrates the necessity of advocates' work. Their
campaigns will continue to promote a variety of fixes, with varying degrees of
success-all of them reflective of, and seeking to extend, a particular normative
vision of a better, more perfectly visible state.

